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The Brazilian budgetary process is characterized by heavy central government
control with wide ranging discretionary authority. State and municipal governments
may try to exploit the discretionary power of the central government by choosing
fiscal actions that will induce the latter to help them. This behavior might result in
an inefficient budget structure in which local governments would try to act as free
riders on federation resources.
This dissertation models the Brazilian budgetary process in two different
frameworks. The first considers an altruistic central government that aims to max-
imize the sum of the state utility functions. The second maximizes the federal
government’s probability of being reelected. In a sequential game in which local
governments play first and the central government plays afterwards, the signs of the
derivatives of the federal government’s discretionary resources distribution reaction
functions are evaluated. The theoretical results are similar for both models in that
there appears a soft budget constraint for decentralized governments.
These reaction functions are then empirically evaluated and negative corre-
lations between state GDP and discretionary transfers, and between compulsory
grants and discretionary transfers are found. The tests could not detect any sig-
nificant relation either between discretionary transfers and local tax collection or
between discretionary transfers and local debt service payments. In other words, no
fiscal behavior exploiting a soft budget constraint was found for Brazilian states and
municipalities. A positive and significant relationship was detected between discre-
tionary transfers and the political power of states. This finding runs counter to the
hypothesis of a purely benevolent federal government; it is consistent with the use
of those transfers to support the re-election of the incumbent federal government.
In addition, the findings indicate that the federal government has used discretionary
grants to offset, at least in part, the redistributive effect of the equalization grants.
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Federal systems, either in pure form or in some impure variety, are contempo-
raneously the dominant administrative arrangement of government. Of course the
world has experienced other types of government structures, from the Greek city-
states to the British Empire, but today federalism appears to be the system most
compatible with democracy.
Nonetheless, federalism is a very broad concept, which encompasses a variety
of political, administrative and economic features. This paper is primarily concerned
with the economic aspects of a federal system, although it has been recognized in
the literature that there are important interactions between the different features1.
The definition of economic federalism, which is far less restrictive than its
legal counterpart, requires that there be at least two levels of government: a higher
level, in general called federal government which must have some economic decision
power over all jurisdictions, and a set of lower level governments, each of them
exerting economic decision power only over a restricted part of the national territory
(Goodspeed 2000).
Thus, the main focus of the economic approach to federalism is on who decides
about the economic aspects of the federation rather than who has the legal right
1Oates (1972) provides the rationale for these interactions as well as some examples. See pages
15 and 16.
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of deciding. For example, if a dictatorial regime delegates some economic decision
power to its appointed provincial officials, it will be considered an economic feder-
ation (e.g. present day China) but not a legal federation. At the other extreme,
if in a democratic country the population delegates to the central government all
economic decision power (e.g. New Zealand), this country will not be considered a
federation in the economic sense2.
The important point about economic federalism is that the existence of a
number of jurisdictional governments, not to mention different levels of government,
will produce several potential channels of interaction. Some of these interactions will
not be economic; the necessity of previous authorization for a police force to cross
a border during the pursuit of criminals is a non-economic example of jurisdictional
interaction.
Economic interactions between governments within a federation, which are
the main topic of this dissertation, have increasingly gained attention in the public
finance literature during the last decades. Since the early work of Musgrave (1959)
and Oates (1972), many social researchers have studied this subject under the title
of Fiscal Federalism.
Recently, the new developments of microeconomic theory have been used to
study the interactions between governments to provide a strategic perspective. From
this point of view, governments within a federation do not behave as isolated in-
stitutions taking the actions of others as exogenous. Rather, they act with the
2Unless the central government implements specific economic policies for each administrative
unit of the country, in which case it would be acting as an economic federation.
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full knowledge that their acts affect and are affected either by the actions at other
government levels or other jurisdictional governments.
One of the manifestations of these strategic interactions between governments
can be a situation in which lower level governments engage in excessive expendi-
tures because they anticipate financial rescue by the central government. This phe-
nomenon has attracted great interest in the fiscal federalism literature; its source
is so-called Soft Budget Constraints. The description of this behavior was first ad-
vanced by Kornai (1980) to explain the relationship between state-owned enterprises
and socialist governments in former communist countries in Europe. However, the
concept has been extended to encompass not only the relationship of firms and
governments in other countries (Qian and Roland, 1998), but also to describe the
interaction between governments within a federation (Rodden, Eskeland and Lit-
vack, 2004).
In the context of a federation, the existence and the potential harmful conse-
quences of soft budget constraints depend on the institutional mechanisms. Thus,
although some general rules may apply, each case must be considered as having its
own characteristics. Because of this, knowing the general implications of soft budget
constraints is not enough either to establish its presence in a governmental system
or to understand how it works in practice in a given federation. Understanding the
peculiar characteristics of each State is crucial to developing effective measures for
budgetary reform.
The general objective of this work is to place the institutions and the func-
tioning of Brazilian fiscal federalism within the perspective of the public finance
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literature and to study empirically the consequences of its modus operandi in order
to see whether soft budget constraints exist, and, if so, how they manifest them-
selves. In particular, we study the budgetary process in Brazil to see how it may
generate soft budget constraints for states and municipalities by giving too much
discretionary power to the federal government.
In order to accomplish this task, this dissertation is divided into six chapters
including this introduction. Chapter two presents a brief description of the devel-
opment of the theory of fiscal federalism in order to place this research within the
context of the existing literature. It describes the early literature in fiscal federal-
ism and how this literature has developed more recently. It also tries to connect
the modeling strategies utilized here with the basic game theoretical principles of
threats and promises.
In Chapter 3, we explore the structure and functioning of Brazilian federal
institutions in order to capture their main features and include them in the the-
oretical model, at least in a stylized form. It begins with a brief overview of the
Brazilian federal system, followed by a description of the division of expenditure and
taxation responsibility between government layers. Afterwards, the existing grant
mechanisms are described. The chapter then turns to an analysis of the debts of
the decentralized levels of government and how they have been bailed out by the
central government. The last topic of this chapter treats the relevant political issues
within the Brazilian federation.
The theoretical models are developed in Chapter 4. These models aim to
capture the main features of Brazilian federalism and to shed light on the implicit
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relationships between government levels. Indeed, this chapter explores three distinct
but intimately related models. First, it considers the totally centralized decision
model in order to establish the properties of the first-best solution. The second
model explores a decentralized decision structure in which the federal government
has a distributive role and acts benevolently. The last model also deals with a
decentralized setting in which the federal government pursues its own interests.
The empirical tests appear in Chapter 5. The reaction functions determined
in the preceding chapter are estimated and the significance of some key variables
are scrutinized in order to evaluate which model is more adequate in explaining the
functioning of the Brazilian federation. Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the




The Soft Budget Constraint in the Second Generation
Theory of Fiscal Federalism
2.1 Basis of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
The basic theory of fiscal federalism appeared within the context of traditional
public finance theory. This “First Generation Fiscal Federalism Theory” (FGT), as
Oates (2005) described it1, is primarily concerned with the assignment of public
functions to the various government levels as well as the welfare implications of this
assignment. This normative theory prescribed how the government should intervene
(because of the existence of public good provision problems, externalities, market
failures, etc.) and defined which level of government is best suited to do the job.
There were several elements in FGT. A key assumption is that local govern-
ment knows best. Thus, the lower the government level, the better it can adjust the
provision of the public goods whose consumption is limited to local residents.
The rationale for this proposition is twofold. The first is a pragmatic one.
There are political difficulties associated with the unequal provision of public goods
across jurisdictions. Many federal countries have laws or regulations that prevent
such an asymmetrical distribution of public outputs. More generally, a basic sense
1Or “First Generation Economic Theory” on federalism as it is called by Qian and Weingast
(1997).
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of fairness may preclude such variation in public outputs.
A more theoretical justification is related to an information problem. Specifi-
cally, the costs incurred by the central government in order to acquire all the infor-
mation necessary to tailor the public good provision to the local population needs
would be greater than those of local governments. What is not clear from the per-
spective of the FGT is why the central government cannot get local agents to act
on its behalf. Local representatives could, in principle, collect and use all relevant
information in order to provide local public goods in welfare maximizing quantities
(and quality). The new approaches to the theory of fiscal federalism have explored
this information asymmetry problem in interesting ways, as we shall see later in this
chapter.
The capacity of lower level governments to provide efficient outputs of public
goods encounters two obstacles: scale economies and externalities. One could expect
that some programs will be less expensive if they are structured to encompass the
nation as a whole rather than serving each state, province or city; thus there might
be some advantages in favor of the centralized provision.
This argument does not consider the possibility of formation of public consor-
tia with the objective of providing certain public services. These consortia could
decrease the unit price of each of the participating governments by taking advantage
of the existing economies of scale.
A second factor that may favor centralized provision is the presence of exter-
nalities. Since the actions of a regional government may affect residents of other
jurisdictions, it may be that regional decisions underestimate the true social costs (or
7
benefits) of regional programs. In this case a central government could internalize
these externalities, increasing the overall welfare. Although externalities may really
have a considerable weight in the provision of public goods, this line of argument
neglects the existence of other mechanisms to deal with them (such as Pigouvian
taxes/subsidies).
This trade-off between decentralized fiscal choice versus externalities and economies
of scale was first expressed by Oates (1972) in the “Decentralization Theorem”. The
theorem lays out a set of sufficient conditions for local provision of public outputs
to yield a higher level of social welfare than a uniformly centrally determined level
of output.
Another main question addressed by the FGT was the so-called “tax assign-
ment” problem. It consists in determining which types of taxes are more appropri-
ate for each level of government. To deal with this subject, one must first recognize
that a non-benefit tax levied on highly mobile tax bases such as labor or capital will
cause distortions, since these factors will tend to relocate from regions where they
are heavily taxed to those where tax burdens are lower. This argument favors the
centralized collection of non-benefit taxes on bases that are highly mobile.
Local government could focus on taxation of non-mobile tax bases, property
for example. This kind of specialization could bring some advantages to the general
welfare, especially if one appeals again to the assumption that local government
“knows better”, since it is to be expected that the data collection and administration
of property taxation would be done in a more efficient way by local governments
than by the central government.
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The utilization of benefit taxes2 by local governments could also be welfare im-
proving. This line of argument leads to the famous Tiebout model in which citizens
relocate in order to choose the locality which provides the preferred combination of
taxes and public goods output. Under the assumptions of perfect individual mobil-
ity and information, each household could increase its welfare by moving to such a
locality and when all households relocate and consequently increase their utilities,
society gets a Pareto optimal outcome. This Pareto improvement would happen
because the existence of several localities with a different tax/public goods mix
would provide conditions for a separating equilibrium in which households would
spontaneously reveal their preferences over public good provision.
It is worthwhile noting that Tiebout sorting, i.e. the process that leads people
to move in order to find the place that is better suited to their preferences, will
tend to group people according to their preferences over public good provision.
This homogenization of the demands in each locality will favor the decentralized
provision of public goods, since the decentralization theorem shows that the higher
the uniformity of preferences within communities, the greater the potential gains in
welfare from the local provision of public goods. This line of argument links the
Tiebout model to the main body of the FGT.
2 Benefit taxes are those which are associated with the provision of some specific public good
and are paid by the agents who actually take advantage of the use of the public good (Stiglitz 1988
and Hines 2000).
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2.2 The Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
More recently some authors have developed a new approach to fiscal federalism.
This new line of research, called the “Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
”3 (SGT), has introduced new ways to look at fiscal decentralization.
The main distinction between the two approaches is that, while the FGT
uses methods and tools of the traditional Theory of the Firm such as economies of
scale and externalities, the SGT aims to utilize the more recent developments of
that theory, as for example the Theory of Contracts, Principal-Agent problems and
agent strategic behavior.
Qian and Weingast (1997) considered the specific application of the Principal-
Agent problem as the main feature of the SGT (see Qian and Weingast 1997, p.83),
while some authors such as Crémer, Estache and Seabright (1996) associate the SGT
with the “Theory of Contracts”. Oates (2005) points out two distinctive character-
istics of the SGT in relation to the FGT: information problems, understood as the
cost of acquiring and processing the relevant information by the various agents in
the federation, and public choice problems attached to federal political processes.
But what do all these approaches have in common? Which general feature
would justify joining them together in a new theoretical structure? From my point
of view, what distinguishes the SGT from the traditional theory of fiscal federalism
is the strategic behavior and interaction of the participants in a federal system.
Households, voters, firms and various levels of government in a federation may
3Qian and Weingast (1997),Oates (2005).
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act strategically and know that the other agents are behaving strategically. This
general characterization includes the “Principal-Agent” problem, the “Incomplete
Contracts” problem and the “Strategic Vote” problem. The following discussion will
explore some of these ideas in the context of the SGT approach to fiscal federalism.
The theory of public choice is not new. During the decade of the 1960’s it
ran parallel with traditional public finance theory. Nonetheless, the development of
ideas that relate this theory to fiscal federalism is relatively recent although some
of the primary insights can be found in earlier work.
For example, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that fiscal decentralization
may reduce the capacity of the state to exploit society through excessive taxation.
This deterrent power of federalism would come from the fact that, mobile households
and firms would constrain government access to tax revenues; economic units can
simply leave the jurisdictions in which the local governments show greater voracity
to those in which they are more moderate. Qian and Weingast (1997) and others
developed this idea more precisely, with distinct modeling strategies, as will be seen
below.
More recently public choice theory has been utilized in close connection with
work in “Political Economy,” and this interaction has had an impact on the public
finance field in general, including its fiscal federalism branch. The introduction of
public choice mechanisms in this field has been utilized mainly to study the benefits
(or the disadvantages) of fiscal decentralization. The point here is that the process
of voting may have an influence on the efficiency of a decentralized government.
Besley and Coate (2003) built a model in which the assumption that the
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central government will supply a uniform level of the public good across localities is
dropped. Their model incorporates both economies of scale of central provision and
externalities. The inefficiency of central provision comes from the political economy
process associated with the decision about the provision of local public goods across
different regions. If the decision process obeys the logic of the minimum winning
coalition, the paper shows the possibility of a misallocation of local public goods
provision skewed towards localities in the coalition. Furthermore, another drawback
in the centralized provision under the minimum coalition system is that it generates
uncertainty over the public provision in each district since, the level of the public
good depends on whether a district is or is not in the winning coalition.
It is interesting to note that this result is maintained, although mitigated, even
in the case of a cooperative process in the legislature. This process is characterized
by a utilitarian bargaining solution, which aims to maximize the joint surplus of the
legislators. Thus, the local public good provision in each locality depends on the
preferences of all legislators. If the median voter of each district were elected as its
legislator, the cooperative legislative solution would replicate the first-best outcome.
But as voters know that the allocation of the public goods depends on the type of
legislators, they may act strategically and the election may not reflect the median
voter’s preference. Let us suppose that the median voter in a particular district has
a stronger preference for public goods than the median voters of all other districts.
Then, voters know that if every locality decides for the allocation that corresponds
to their median voter, the total public good provision will be below their ideal level,
because his preferences towards public goods are much higher than the average.
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Thus, acting in his best interest, he will vote for a delegate with an even higher
preference for public goods. Median voters from other districts will act in a similar
way, but in the opposite direction. Thus, the cooperative system does not achieve
the Pareto optimal result because, in spite of avoiding outcome uncertainty and
misallocation which arise in the minimum winning coalition context, it raises a new
problem: the strategic delegation problem.
Other studies also use the tools of public choice analysis in order to compare
the centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods, some of them finding
quite distinct results from those obtained by Besley and Coate (2003). For example,
Person and Tabellini (1996) design a model in which risk-sharing arrangements
between districts may increase each individual district’s propensity to adopt riskier
policies. This paper examines which constitutional designs exacerbate (or mitigate)
this moral hazard problem. The political economy outcome is greatly influenced
by the collective decision process and this paper analyzes several of such processes
to determine the outcomess under different fiscal constitutions. In this context,
centralization may be a good way of ruling out the moral hazard problem, even if
no factor mobility is allowed in the model. Furthermore, delegation may mean a
higher degree of commitment toward a primarily non-stable second best. In short,
the effects of centralization and delegation here are just the opposite from those
found in Besley and Coate (2003).
Turning to the application of the Principal-Agent problem in the context of
fiscal federalism, one should note that it goes one step further than its use in other
public finance situations. Traditionally, the application of the Principal-Agent prob-
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lem in public finance is done by supposing that the public official (agent) who is
responsible by delegation for the management of public affairs, may have his own
motivations that are not necessarily coincident with the interests of the constituents
(principals). But in a federation, it may be the case that some government levels
can delegate responsibility to some other government level. In this situation, the
relation between principal and agent occurs with governments and not with indi-
vidual agents4. For example, in the model developed in Chapter 4 (as well as in
Goodspeed 2002, Levaggi 2002 or Keen 1997, among others) the federation works as
follows: states (principals) delegate some decision power to the central government
(agent) in the hope that the latter will act on their behalf.
From a different perspective, Qian and Weingast (1997) suggest that decen-
tralization would be an efficient way of addressing the Principal-Agent problem that
arises in certain kinds of government delegation situations. If the government is to-
tally centralized, its citizens will have neither comparison parameters to judge its
quality nor the option of “voting with their feet”. In other words, there will be
no competition between governments and, in the absence of effective mechanisms
through which the citizens could control the government, the latter would have a
free hand to extract resources from the former beyond the desired level. If the gov-
ernment is decentralized, the existence of a number of different jurisdictions will
constrain taxation by the self-interested government since the mobility of the resi-
dents will punish those governments that impose excessive taxes. This idea was first
4Naturally, this kind of the new application of the Principal-Agent problem does not exclude the
possibility of its use in a more traditional sense and a fair amount of work within this framework
has been done.
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formulated by Brennan and Bucanan (1980), as mentined before, but these authors
did not place it in a Principal-Agent context.
Another example of the application of the Principal-Agent approach to the
federation context can be found in Levaggi (2002). The article in question tries to
verify if, within the context of asymmetry of information, the central government
(principal, in this model) is better off transferring earmarked grants or open-ended
grants to local governments (agents). When Central Government transfers ear-
marked grants, it is said that the public sector operates under the “double budget
constraint”. Under this rule, Central Government defines not only the size of the
total budget but also its distribution among the various expenditure functions. The
paper shows that, contrary to the established budgetary wisdom, the “double bud-
get constraint” may attenuate the Principal-Agent problem that arises when the
objectives of the two government tiers are very different.
The theory of contracts has been utilized within the context of the SGT to
explain federation relationships. Crémer, Estache and Seabright (1996) use this the-
ory to explore asymmetric information between levels of government. In their view,
lower level governments have more information than their higher-level counterparts
because they obtain more benefits from gathering information about the preferences
of their constituents. The level of accountability to which each government tier is
submitted explains this endogeneity of information acquisition: the lower the gov-
ernment tier, the greater the probability of replacement if the government does not
follow the preferences of the constituents.
The authors also point out the advantages of decentralization in the presence
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of incomplete contracts. If the government has to decide on an issue, which is not
specified in the federation constitution (which is the relevant contract in this case),
the greater accountability of lower level governments will favor a better solution
to the citizens of the jurisdiction than the measure that would be adopted by a
higher-level, but less accountable, government.
The renegotiation of contracts is another source of problems in the federation
context. Let us suppose that during the execution of a contract, it is observed that
a modification in the contract may increase the utility of both parties involved. In
this case there will be a strong tendency for the renegotiation of the initial terms
of the contract. The problem here is that, if the parties can foresee renegotiation,
they can modify their behavior in the previous periods in order to gain advantage
in the renegotiation process. Thus, the moral hazard problem associated with the
renegotiation possibility might lead the contract to be sub-optimal. This effect
would help to clarify the “soft budget constraint” phenomenon as will be seen later.
2.3 Non-Credible Threats and Promises
It has been suggested that the distinction between threats and promises is
merely semantic. Thus a promise of doing something would be equivalent to a
threat of not doing that thing and vice-versa5. But, in order to be precise, one must
recognize that there is a conceptual difference between the two ideas.
5 “. . . the distinction between a threat and a promise depends only on what you call the status
quo. . . A compellent threat is just like a deterrent promise with a change of the status quo; likewise,
a deterrent threat and a compellent promise differ only in their status quo.” (Dixit and Nalebuff
1991, pages 125–126).
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Threats and promises are both strategic statements in which one player com-
mits himself to an action that he may have no incentive to adopt. The distinction
between the two concepts is that in a threat there is the prospect of punishment to
the other party if he does not cooperate, while in the promise there is the prospect
of reward for cooperation (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, page 125). The concepts are
not interchangeable because the agent has well defined preferences over the actions.
Thus, to follow the Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) example, if a mugger says to his
victim “I will shoot you if you do not give me your wallet”, this is a threat because
the criminal would be acting against his ex post interests if he shoots the victim. It
is a different situation if he says “I promise I will not hurt you if you give me your
wallet.” On the one hand, this is not a promise in the game theory sense but rather
it is merely an assurance in which the player is trying to communicate his payoff
function to the other party. On the other hand, it is not clear if the bandit will hurt
the victim in the case of not receiving the wallet.
Both threats and promises are associated with credibility problems because the
commitment of one agent to a strategy which is not preferred by him may not be
believed by the other party, since he might always break his word and act according
to his a posteriori interests when the chance appears. The lack of credibility of a
commitment will undermine its desired effect because it will fail in changing the
expectation of the other party about the response.
There are several ways in which the credibility of a commitment might be
enhanced such as the reputation of the committed party and the adoption of for-
mal or informal contracts. These two items are not infallible ways of assuring the
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commitment since sometimes, as described by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), reputation
might be built only to be advantageously broken in the future and contracts cannot
cover all possible cases even when they are formally available.
Kidland and Prescott (1977) incorporated the literature of non-credible promises
into macroeconomics. In this seminal work, the authors developed the concept of
time inconsistency, which can be viewed as a non-credible promise. They use a
monetary policy example: the monetary authority may produce inflation in order
to promote an increase in GDP because there is in the model a Phillips curve which
associates higher than expected inflation with increased output. Thus, only surprise
inflation can raise GDP. The agents, knowing that the monetary authority has an
incentive to deliver higher than expected inflation, will tend to increase their infla-
tion expectations and thus decrease their monetary holdings below what would be
optimal for them. This situation is inefficient. On the one hand, the equilibrium
inflation will be higher than zero, and on the other hand there will be no gain in
GDP since this higher inflation will not surprise anyone.
This perverse equilibrium will occur if agents do not believe in the promise
of the monetary authority not to produce surprise inflation. Once agents have
formulated their inflation expectation equal to zero, the non production of surprise
inflation is against the immediate interests of the monetary authority and thus the
commitment may lack credibility.
The analysis of threat credibility and consequences has been extensively stud-
ied in several contexts. Dixit (1979) utilizes the idea to analyze the effects of poten-
tial competition on a monopolist. He describes a situation in which an established
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firm threatens a potential entrant with a predatory output increase and consequently
a severe fall in sale prices should the prospective competitor effectively enter the mar-
ket. In this example, now a classical textbook example, the author associates the
credibility conditions of the threat with the monopolist’s excess production capacity.
Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) apply the notion of non-credible threats in the
context of intergenerational relationships and derive a justification for the adoption
of compulsory social security systems as social welfare enhancers. The model is built
on Gary Becker’s famous “Rotten Kid Theorem” but the results are quite distinct.
In this model there are two overlapping generations, parents and children, who
live for two periods. The parents derive utility from their own consumption and from
the utility obtained by their children. This fact, which is known to the children, leads
to an inefficient outcome. The children will overspend in the first period expecting
to be helped by the parents in the second period, since their underconsumption in
the second period will affect their parents. In this case the parents’ threat of not
helping in case of overspending (and consequently undersaving) in the first period
is not credible. Even if the parents make the threat in the first period, the children
know that they will have reasons to go back on their word and be tempted to help
when the situation actually happens. Summarizing, the parents will have incentives
not to enforce their threat when faced with the fait accompli of lower than optimum
savings.
In this context, the savings generated by a compulsory social security system
will tend to avoid the problem since the saving decision would be out of the hands
of the second generation. It is worthwhile noting that Paul Samuelson (1958), in his
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pathbreaking paper, arrives at the same conclusion but for the opposite reason. In
his model there is no altruism, the source of inefficiency is the overaccumulation in
the first period in order to assure the appropriate level of consumption in the second
period. The introduction of a compulsory ‘pay-as-you-go’ social security system in
this context would guarantee resources for the second period, and consequently
would decrease the necessity of saving in the first period.
2.4 The Soft Budget Constraint in Federation Relationships
The concept of non-credible threats is an essential part of the Soft Budget
Constraint (SBC). This phenomenon, first described by Kornai (1980, 1986), is
characterized by a situation in which “the strict relationship between expenditures
and earnings has been relaxed, because excess expenditure over earnings will be paid
by some other institution, typically by the State” (Kornai 1986, page 4). It was first
utilized to describe the behavior of state-owned enterprises in socialist economies. In
this context, the SBC arises from the fact that these firms do not take as credible the
government no-helping threat in case they get into economic or financial troubles.
The managers of state-owned firms know that the job loss caused by an eventual
closing will hurt the political interests of the government, and thus the bailout is
consistent with government interests.
A series of papers in this line followed Jánus Kornai. One could cite Pun
(1995), Prell (1996), Li and Liang (1997), Maskin (1999), Qian (1994), and Qian
and Roland (1998). In this last paper, the SBC principle is extended to settings
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outside the socialist world. The concept is used to compare federative arrangements
with different levels of centralization and includes the possibility of monetary de-
centralization. The innovative feature of this paper in relation to others that use
the SBC concept is that the SBC is considered in a public budget environment and
not limited to enterprise bailout situations.
Qian and Roland (1998) utilize a three tier hierarchy model (federal govern-
ment, local governments and enterprises that can be state or foreign owned) and
develop a sequential bailout game in which enterprises decide their action first and
the local government decides whether to bail them out or not. Local governments
compete for mobile foreign owned enterprises and play a sequential game compet-
ing with the Union for grants. Decentralization plus capital mobility may harden
budget constraints but may also lead to allocative distortions. If there are federal
grants, both of the above effects may be amplified. Even if the grants come from
monetary seignioriage, the hardening effect over the budget constraint persists.
This generalization of the SBC idea in order to encompass federative rela-
tionships has been explored in the fiscal federalism literature. Inman (2004) has
developed an intuitive explanation for this application in the federative context.
In this sequential game, local governments choose their action in the first period.
They can either choose responsible fiscal behavior or the generation of unfunded
fiscal deficits. In the second period, the federal government, after having observed
the chosen strategy of the local government, chooses between the financial rescue
of the local government or allowing default. This Default-Bailout game is graphi-
cally shown in Figure 2.1. L represents the payoffs of the local government and C
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represents the payoffs of the central or federal government.
One of the main questions that arises from this simple game is related to
the credibility conditions for the non-bailout threat of the federal government. The
problem is that if C2 is greater than C1, i.e., if the central government payoff increases
when it bails out a troubled local government, the local government will have the
incentive to adopt irresponsible fiscal polices even if L3 > L1 provided that L2 > L3.
These local government payoff conditions are likely to be met, since when a local
government adopts irresponsible fiscal polices it increases, in general, the disposable
income of its constituents by increasing payments to persons or by reducing taxation.
The cost of these policies comes when the local government has to adjust its accounts
to repay the spent resources. As in most situations, this kind of cost overwhelms
the initial benefits and it is probable that L3 > L1. But, if the central government
helps the local government, the latter will have the initial benefits without bearing
full costs, and thus L2 > L3 is a strong possibility.
On the side of the federal government, the payoffs are less direct. On the one
hand, it is more or less obvious that C3 is greater than C2, i.e., the best situation from
the point-of-view of the federal government is that in which the local government
adopts responsible fiscal polices and the central government does not suffer pressure
for bailouts. On the other hand, several factors may determine whether C1 is greater
than C2 or not. In a once-for-all game, the possibility that C1 < C2 is greater
because it is probable that events that affect local government negatively have also
a negative effect over the central government. Thus, political pressures, the media,
the complaints of voters and so on, may lead the central government to a financial
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bailout of a troubled local government. But if the game is repeated, the federal
government might consider the reputation effect of a non-bailout strategy even if
the state had chosen irresponsible polices. In this case, a reputation for not helping
poorly administrated jurisdictions may avoid poor administration in the first place.
Other authors also explored the concept of SBC in the relationship of distinct
government tiers. Wildsin (1997) develops a model in which the probability of help
from the central government to local government is influenced by the size of the
latter. Thus, larger jurisdictions would have a greater chance of being bailed out.
This happens in his model because of the existence of externalities. The federal
government helps the larger jurisdictions not only because of its concern with the
wellbeing of the residents of those localities but also because of the negative impact
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on the other jurisdictions. This is the “too big to fail” case.
The model developed in Goodspeed (2002) is in the same spirit but used for a
politically motivated federal government. In this model, the regional governments
decide first (and simultaneously) how much they will spend and borrow. Afterwards,
the central government will distribute grants in order to maximize the probability
of being reelected. As first movers, regional governments use backward induction
in order to maximize their own individual welfare. In this process, regional govern-
ments must determine the reaction function of the central government in order to
take advantage of the situation. As the regional governments move simultaneously,
the result is a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium in which the overspending and over-
borrowing of the regional government will be financed by an increase in the federal
tax rate and a distortion between public good consumption (too high) and private
good consumption (too low).
All these studies of the SBC have at least one common point. The SBC
generates an inefficient outcome. Thus, the research agenda in this field seems
to be based on three lines of action. First, the empirical methods used to detect
the existence of the SBC in distinct situations must be improved. This line of
research is needed since the mere existence of a theoretical rationale for the SBC
does not imply its presence in real situations. Second, federations are institutions
themselves; moreover their functioning is guided by institutional rules. Thus, it is
necessary to identify which institutional mechanisms facilitate the existence of the
SBC in federation relationships. Third, once the presence of the SBC has been
detected in a federation and its source has been established, it would be desirable
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in most of cases to reform the system. Thus, the design of institutional mechanisms
that embody a harder budget constraint is another important point in the research
agenda of this field.
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Chapter 3
Economic Aspects of Brazilian Federalism
3.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of Brazilian federalist
institutions and processes and to connect them to the theoretical model of the next
chapter. Every theoretical model is a simplification of reality, but when one is
trying to analyze the particular situation of a country the assumptions made must
be compatible with the peculiarities of the studied country. For example, if someone
is studying the US presidential elections, he must recognize that in this country the
electoral votes come from the states and not from the individual voters and that
implies that voters in different states have different voting weights.
Brazil is an interesting country for a number of reasons. First of all, the country
is not yet in an institutional equilibrium, which means that a substantial number
of institutional changes have yet to be made. Furthermore, some of the existing
institutions generate so many economic distortions that the task of understanding
why they actually exist is a challenging one.
In this chapter, four broad issues of Brazilian federalism are discussed: the
Brazilian revenue system, the sharing of federal resources among states and munic-
ipalities, the evolution of the Brazilian state debt, and the political process of the
Brazilian legislative power. Of course, there is no intention of discussing all aspects
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of these subjects. The goal here is to present information about the Brazilian case
sufficient to enable the reader to follow the theoretical modelling strategy and the
empirical estimation of the next two chapters.
3.2 Expenditure Functions by Government Layer
The division of expenditure functions by government layer in Brazil has fol-
lowed closely the political environment of the country. During the military regime,
which was established in 1964 and lasted until 1986, the central government was
responsible not only for all expenditure planning but also for most of the implemen-
tation. States and municipalities played a secondary role during this period and
most of them could be considered mere local branches of the federal government.
The total dominance of the federal government was reflected in both political
and economic spheres. On the political side, the federal government had a major
weight in the election of the state governors. The electoral law allowed the central
government to impeach opposition candidates if they were considered too leftist.
Besides, most of the major Brazilian cities were considered “national security areas”
and their mayors were appointed by the central government.
On the economic side, states and municipalities were completely dependent
on resources from the federal government. Both low levels of local taxation and
expenditure autonomy created a situation in which the role of the local government
was restricted to elementary education (municipalities) and public security (states).
With the end of the military regime, devolution movements accompanied the
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pressure for more political liberty. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution somehow sat-
isfied both demands. On the political front the new Constitution reestablished
democracy while in the economic sphere it created new local taxes as well as in-
creasing the participation of the states and municipalities in the federal tax collec-
tion1. This increase in resources available to local governments was not followed by
a corresponding increase in their expenditure responsibilities. On the contrary, fed-
eral government expenditure functions were increased in relation to local functions,
since most of the new humanitarian rights recognized by the new Constitution were
placed under federal responsibility.
This situation, which could be considered by local governments as an opportu-
nity to consolidate their autonomy from the central government, was clearly missed.
Instead of taking over expenditure areas in which the Constitution was indefinite or
ambiguous, local governments rushed to increase their payrolls. In most cases the
hiring of new civil servants was unnecessary; it was done on a massive scale in order
to consolidate political spheres of influence.
Brazilian government payrolls are very inflexible. Public servants cannot be
dismissed, and their wages have a steady rate of growth which is not correlated with
their performance. Thus, this massive hiring of public servants had a great impact
on local government finances and consequently on their expenditure capacity when,
for a number of reasons, local government revenues began to shrink.
Among the various reasons for this fall in local revenues, two deserve to be
1For a complete description of the changes in the tax structure promoted by the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution see Rezende (1995).
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mentioned. First, the recession that hit Brazil in the beginning of the 1990’s led
to a sharp decline in local government revenues as well as in the federal revenue to
be shared with states and municipalities. Second, the federal government began to
implement a strategy of collecting revenues which were not constitutionally shared
with states and municipalities, thus reducing the participation in shared revenues.
The issue of debt temporarily accommodated the financial difficulties of the
states and municipalities, but in the long run it restricted even more the expenditure
capacity of the local governments. Furthermore, as most of the local debt is held
by the federal government, it has tried to control local government expenditures for
the sake of the debt service. Naturally, this whole process implies less autonomy for
local governments.
In spite of the financial restrictions on local governments, their political power
combined with decentralization needs in the provision of some public goods and
services have allowed some room for local government expenditure. Nowadays, they
are concentrated in projects with high electoral visibility and in programs in which
there are matching grants from the federal government like health and education.
The final configuration of the expenditure assignments by government layer
that emerges from the process described above may be summarized as follows. First,
in spite of the financial problems faced by local governments, the political pressure
for devolution that occurred after the fall of the military regime succeeded in increas-
ing the expenditure role of states and municipalities. In year 2002 local governments
were responsible for some 40% of the total government expenditure (municipalities
13% and states 27%).
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Second, as the process has evolved in a non-coordinated way, most of the
expenditures are overlapping. Table 3.1 shows the expenditure by function at the
federal level. It is worthwhile to notice that Brazilian budgetary classification has
28 functions here aggregated into only 10.
Table 3.1:
Federal Expenditure by Category in Millions of Dollars: Brazil 2002
Category Value % Federal % Category
Debt Service 68,167 45.3 78.17
Social Security 47,321 31.5 83.93
Health 8,708 5.8 41.09
Administration 6,825 4.5 31.00
Infrastructure 5,917 3.9 50.48
Defense 4,774 3.2 99.81
Education 4,700 3.1 18.49
Agriculture 2,789 1.9 58.81
Public Welfare 895 0.6 10.96
Housing 243 0.2 3.51
Total 150,340 100 60.48
Source: Federal Treasury Secretariat.
The function “Administration” includes the three branches of the government
(executive, legislative and judiciary) in each level. It can be seen as a measure of
30
government efficiency: the smaller its participation in the total expenditure, the
more efficient the government. Note also that federal outlays account for more than
60% of the total government expenditure2.
Due to the huge National debt, financial expenditure (Debt Service) consumes
45% of the federal resources. The second largest item is “Social Security” which
takes 31.5% of the federal resources. In the other functions, excluding “Public
Welfare” and “Housing”, the federal government expenditure is a significant part
of the total despite the lower weight they have in the federal expenditure. This
profile indicates that, although federal government resources are largely consumed
by debt service and social security payments, they still are important in financing
other functions.
Table 3.2 describes the state expenditures (26.73% of the total by functions).
Although “Debt Service” is also the principal component of state expenditure, it
can be seen that states have a more equalized pattern of expenditure than the
central government. Their role is relevant in all functions but “Defense”, and it is of
fundamental importance in such functions as “Education”, “Public Welfare” (which
includes public security) and “Infrastructure”.
Table 3.3 provides a profile of municipality expenditure. It represented 12.78%
of the total government expenditure in 2002 and was very concentrated in “Educa-
tion,” “Health” and “Housing” while having important participation in “Infrastruc-
ture” and “Agriculture”.
2 All amounts in this text will be converted from Brazilian Reais to US dollars by the annual
average selling rate provided by the Brazilian Central Bank.
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Table 3.2:
State Expenditure by Category in Millions of Dollars: Brazil 2002
Category Value % State % Category
Debt Services 17,599 26.5 20.18
Education 12,440 18.7 48.95
Administration 9,611 14.5 43.66
Public Welfare 7,056 10.6 86.40
Social Security 6,435 9.7 11.41
Health 5,936 8.9 28.01
Infrastructure 4,393 6.6 37.47
Housing 1,590 2.4 22.92
Agriculture 1,391 2.1 29.32
Defense 0 0.0 0.00
Total 66,450 100.0 26.73
Source: Federal Treasury Secretariat.
3.3 Revenue Matters
The Brazilian revenue system is composed of federal, state and municipal
taxes which totaled almost 130 billion dollars in 2002. The share of each level
of government has been stable in recent years with federal taxes accounting for
approximately 63% of the total national tax revenue in that year, state taxes for
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Table 3.3:
Municipality Expenditure by Category in Millions of Dollars: Brazil 2002
Category Value % Municipal % Category
Education 8,275 26.0 32.56
Health 6,550 20.6 30.90
Administration 5,579 17.6 25.34
Housing 5,105 16.1 73.57
Social Security 2,622 8.3 4.65
Debt Services 1,440 4.5 1.65
Infrastructure 1,412 4.4 12.05
Agriculture 563 1.8 11.87
Public Welfare 216 0.7 2.64
Defense 9 0.0 0.19
Total 31,771 100.0 12.78
Source: Federal Treasury Secretariat.
33
32% and municipal taxes for 5% of the total. Table 3.4 shows the temporal pattern
of the Brazilian tax revenue by government level.
Table 3.4:
Tax Revenue in Billions of Dollars by Government Layer and by Year: Brazil 1998
to 2002
Federal State Municipality
Year Revenue (%) Revenue (%) Revenue (%) Total
1998 114.75 63.7 56.43 31.3 8.86 4.9 180.04
1999 83.48 62.5 44.08 33.0 5.98 4.5 133.54
2000 96.69 63.4 47.75 31.3 8.09 5.3 152.52
2001 83.68 62.6 43.31 32.4 6.75 5.0 133.74
2002 83.20 64.0 40.29 31.0 6.44 5.0 129.93
Source: Federal Revenue and Customs Secretariat and National Treasury Secretariat.
At the federal level, as can be seen in Table 3.5, 40.15% of the total tax revenue
came from income taxes in 2003 (personal or corporate), 28.13% from corporate gross
revenues, 12.92% from consumption, 10.06% from financial transactions and 8.74%
from other sources including property taxes and delayed tax payments.
Thus, a big share of Brazilian tax revenues is income based or related to bases
that are proportional to income, as in the case of financial transactions and corporate
revenues3. Consumption taxes account for 11.91% of the total collection. As there
3 As strange as it may seem the CSLL and the COFINS are not specifically utilized for the
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Table 3.5:
Federal Tax Revenue in Millions of Dollars and Economic Incidence by Type of
Tax: Brazil 2003
Tax Source Revenue % Total
Income Tax (IR) Personal and corporate in-
come
30,225 34.03
Social Security Contribution over
Net Profit (CSLL)
Corporate income 5,442 6.13
Contributions for Special Pro-
grams (PIS/PASEP)
Gross revenue 5,633 6.34
Social Security Financing Contri-
bution (COFINS)
Corporate gross revenue 19,355 21.79
Industrialized Product Tax (IPI) Consumption 6,393 7.20
Imports Tax Consumption 2,646 2.98
Tax over Petroleum Derivatives
(CIDE)
Fuel consumption 2,436 2.74
Financial Transaction Tax
(CPMF)
Financial transactions 7,489 8.43
Credit Operation Tax (IOF) Credit operations 1,446 1.63
Tax over Rural Property (ITR) Property 95 0.11
Contribution for the Public Ser-
vant Social Security Plan
Various 1,447 1.63
Contribution for Enhancement of
Fiscal Performance (FUNDAP)
Various 105 0.12
Other Revenues Various 6,113 6.88
Total Tax Revenue 88,825 100.00
Source: Federal Revenue and Customs Secretariat.
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will be no savings in the model of the next chapter, consumption will be considered
proportional to income and thus, consumption tax collection will depend on income.
As property taxation is negligible at the federal level, it will be assumed that income
is the only tax base available to the federal government.
In the case of states, consumption taxes play a major role (see Table 3.6). In
2003 more than 80% of the total state tax revenue came from the state consumption
tax (ICMS). This tax is a value added tax and it is origin based. This means that
the producer state collects the tax independently from where the good is going to
be consumed. Thus, when a retailer from Amazonas buys something from a São
Paulo wholesaler, the tax is collected by the São Paulo state government, in general,
18% of the sale value. Amazonas state government will only collect the tax over the
difference between the retailer buying and selling price4.
This system causes various types of inefficiencies in the national economy.
First, producer states have an incentive to raise the tax over the efficient level,
because they underestimate the marginal cost of doing so, since another state’s
consumers will pay the bill. Second, consumer states have an incentive to decrease
the ICMS tax rate in order to attract business. This process, known in Brazil as
“Fiscal War”, is in part possible because states expect to be helped by the Federal
government. In this case, the soft budget constraint faced by state governments is
directly linked to the fiscal war. Administrative inefficiencies are also important in
Social Security system financing as may appear in table 3.3. This table does not include the “true”
Social Security financing tax.
4 One of the few exceptions to this rule is the petroleum derivative products, for which a federal
law requires that the consumption tax be charged in the destination state.
36
this system; each state must keep checking posts in their borders to make sure that
the out-of-state merchandize has paid taxes.
Table 3.6:
Aggregated States Revenue in Millions of Dollars and Economic Incidence by Type
of Tax: Brazil 2002
Tax Source Revenue % Total
Tax over Consumption (ICMS) Consumption 32,877.4 81.6
Income Tax Income 1,170.2 2.9
Tax over Automobiles (IPVA) Property 2,217.8 5.5
Benefit Taxes Various 3,866.5 9.6
Bequest Tax Property 162.8 0.4
Total Tax Revenue 40,294.8 100.00
Source: National Treasury Secretariat.
In light of these data, states’ taxes will be assumed to be proportional to
consumption. One difficulty that arises within this approach is that, as the state
consumption tax is origin based, tax collection in a given state depends on the
consumption of all other states. Thus, in order to correctly endogenize state tax
collection, one must establish a state tax revenue function which would be dependent
on all other states income.
The municipal tax base is much more diversified. As Table 3.7 shows, in year
2002, 40.4% of the total municipal tax revenue came from property taxes, while
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39.1% came from the consumption tax, 11.9% from taxes levied on business and
8.7% from income tax.
Table 3.7:
Aggregated Municipalities Revenue in Millions of Dollars and Economic Incidence
by Type of Tax: Brazil 2002
Tax Source Revenue % Total
Tax over Services (ISS) Consumption 2,521.8 39.14
Tax over Urban Property (IPTU) Property 2,125.5 32.99
Income Tax Income 558.1 8.66
Municipal Service Contribution Business tax 548.7 8.52
Bequest Tax Property 456.3 7.08
Contribution to Police Department Business tax 209.9 3.26
City Improvement Contribution Property 22.0 0.34
Total Tax Revenue 6,442.3 100.00
Source: National Treasury Secretariat.
This diversity in the municipal tax base would require a much more complex
approach for municipal tax revenues. In particular, municipal budget constraints
would have to include several elements in order to capture the diversity of tax bases.
But, since total municipal tax revenue is quite small in relation to other government
level collections, the former is going to be neglected in the model of the next chapter.
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3.4 Grants to States and Budgetary Execution
Regional disparities in Brazil are one of the greatest problems in the country
and have been described as one of the greatest in the entire world [see Rodden
(2003) and UNPD (2003)]. This undesirable situation and the policies that should
be adopted to solve it have been one of main themes in Brazilian politics during the
last decades.
The proposed policies to solve, or at least to reduce the problem, range from
measures to increase the competitiveness of the poorest states, like increased auton-
omy in setting their preferred tax levels, to direct redistribution of resources made
through the constitutional participation (equalization) funds.
The equalization funds have been a central feature of Brazilian federalism,
but unfortunately their success in decreasing regional disparities in Brazil is very
limited [see Rodden (2003)]. One of the central questions of this work is why? Our
hypothesis is that the federal government offsets the effects of the equalization funds
by compensating states and municipalities that are net contributors to those funds
with voluntary grants and discretionary resources.
The two main funds are the Participation Fund of the States (FPE) and the
Participation Fund of the Municipalities (FPM). The main financing sources of these
funds are the Federal Income Tax (IR) and the Federal Tax over Industrialized
Products (IPI): 22% of the total collection of these taxes goes to the FPE and
22.5% goes to the FPM. As these shares are stipulated by the Constitution, the
amounts received by states and municipalities may be regarded as exogenous, since
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the federal government has no discretionary power over them. Because of this, in the
next chapter these equalization funds will be aggregated and treated as exogenous.
It will be also assumed that the budgets for these funds are always balanced. This
eliminates the need for writing an equation for them.
The FPE was conceived to reduce both state and regional5 inequalities. In
order to tackle the latter, 85% of the total amount of the fund is split among the
states of the poorer regions (Midwest, Northeast and North), which embrace 20
states, and the remaining 15% among the 7 states of the richer regions (South and
Southeast).
The other sharing criteria are the reciprocal of the state per capita income,
the total population of the state and the state geographical area, since big states
are supposed to have more expensive infrastructure needs.
In the year 2001, FPE distributed more than 6 billion dollars to Brazilian
states, which accounts for 1.2% of the country’s GDP. The recipients of the largest
transfers were Bahia (US$ 573 millions), Ceará (US$ 447 millions), Maranhão (US$
440 millions) and Pernambuco (US$ 421 millions), all of them from the Northeast
(poorest) region.
A statistical evaluation of the FPE for year 20016 is described by the estimated
regression equation below, where FPE i is the total amount in dollars received by
state i from the fund in 2001, PCYS i is per capita income of state i in that year also
5 Brazilian territory is formed by 27 federative units (26 states and the Federal District, which
contains the National capital) and 5 regions (South, Southeast, Midwest, Northeast and North).
6 The utilization of data from 2001 is due to the fact that this is the last year to which
information about states GDP is available.
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measured in millions of dollars, FPOP i is a population factor
7 related to state i in
2001, which is measured in terms of percentage of the total population, AREAi is
the state’s geographical area in square kilometers and REGIO i is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if state i is in region North, Northeast or Midwest and zero otherwise.













With the exception of the criterion related to the geographical area, the distri-
bution of the fund follows the original spirit of the law. The FPE amount received
by a state is negatively related to its per capita income; more precisely, each addi-
tional dollar in a state per capita income costs 58.9 thousand dollars in FPE funds.
This means that, if the per capita income of some state grows by 100 dollars, its
revenue from FPE decreases 5.89 millon dollars, according to the sharing criteria.
In the case of the population the relation is positive. The equation above says
that each percentage point in the total country’s population earns more than 33
million dollars for a state. Thus, each 1% of the total population entitles the state
to receive 0.55% of the funds’ money.
The geographical area was included in the equation because it was one of the
7 The distribution of the FPE is not meant to be strictly proportional to the population itself;
states with less that 2% of the total population of the country receive more than their population
share, while states with more than 5% of the total population receive less. In the case of the FPM
the same principle is applied and there is also a differentiation between states’ capitals and other
municipalities.
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criteria established in the original fund law. Nonetheless, as can be seen in the
estimated equation above, it is not statistically significant in the sharing of the
FPE resources. The FPE has an interregional distributive role, though. A 155
million dollar bonus was given to states of the poorest regions (North, Northeast
and Midwest).
The FPM is the municipal version of the FPE. In the year 2001 it distributed
5.251 billion dollars to 4,601 municipalities8, which accounts for a little more than
1% of Brazil’s GDP.
Some modifications are needed in order to perform an evaluation of the FPM in
year 2001. First, the FPM is legally structured to give an extra benefit to capitals.
This feature is accommodated by the introduction of a dummy variable (CAP ),
which assumes a value of one if the data refer to a capital city and zero otherwise.
Second, as the variable AREA has no legal role in the distribution of the fund, it
was removed from the equation. The estimated equation is shown below:












The regression analysis shows that the FPM does not redistribute regionally
or it does so in a very weak way, since the REGIO variable, defined in the same
way as above, is not significant at the 5% level. But the FPM does redistribute to
the poorer cities as indicated by the negative coefficient associated with the variable
8 Actually, there were 5,506 municipalities in Brazil at that year, but some of them did not
receive their share in the FPM because they had some irregularity in their fiscal accounts.
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PCYM (per capita municipal income). Each additional dollar in municipal per
capita income costs that city 157.67 dollars in FPM funds. This means that an
increase of 100 dollars in the per capita income of some city will reduce its FPM
revenue in by 1.58 thousand dollars, everything else constant.
The population factor is relevant in the distribution of the FPM since the
coefficient related two FPOP is significant and greater than zero. Furthermore, the
dummy variable CAP shows that capital cities have a 22.9 million dollars bonus.
The regression equations have a high degree of explanative power which sug-
gests that the funds have been distributed roughly in accordance with the legal
parameters. As the fund is fulfilling its role, the possible explanation for the persis-
tence of regional and state inequality must come from elsewhere9. One could argue
that the funds are not well designed since they create the wrong incentives for poor
states and municipalities; once they have a guaranteed funding source, they may not
choose the appropriate tax policies which could provide the necessary infrastructure
for local development.
Another possible reason is that there is no point in creating an equalization
fund if the federal government compensates the net donors of such funds by using
other types of transfers. At first one could argue that the voluntary transfers are
not large enough to play this anti-redistributive role, since they sum up to 1.6
billion dollars in 2003 which corresponds to only a little more than 13% of the
12.3 billion dollars of the FPE and FPM together. Furthermore, these voluntary
9 Although the FPM does not have a direct regional redistribution effect, it has a local income
redistributive effect, which should help to reduce regional disparities since the poorest cities are in
general located in the poorest regions.
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transfers made by the federal government to states and municipalities also have had
an income redistributive character since poor states receive a big share of them.
For example, North, Northeast and Midwest states had in 2003 approximately 43%
of the total Brazilian population but received more than 61% of the total federal
voluntary transfers10.
The problem with this line of argument is what are called voluntary transfers.
The figures computed above include only what is officially denominated “Volun-
tary Federal Transfers to States and Municipalities”, but these transfers are only a
small part of the resources that may be discretionally transferred from the federal
government to lower layer governments.
Indeed the main source of voluntary federal resource transfers is directly linked
to the liberation of funds of the federal budget. The Brazilian spending process
allows the executive branch to make rescissions and deferrals of budgetary resources
without the approval of the parliament. This means that magnitudes indicated in the
budget are upper limits to federal government spending, but the central government
is not required to spend all the subscribed amounts. Table 3.8 compares the actual
expenditure with the amounts previously budgeted.
Often rescissions are made according to policy objectives. For example, if the
central government and the International Monetary Fund make an agreement for
a new and greater target for the primary surplus, the federal government may cut
parts of the budget without consulting the congress in order to obtain the new level
of surplus.
10 Source: National Treasury Secretariat.
44
Table 3.8:













Year Outlays %Budget Outlays %Budget Outlays %Budget Outlays %Budget
1995 41.37 96.01 84.84 85.85 12.51 49.59 122.98 60.63
1996 40.73 97.25 92.01 81.97 19.08 67.78 135.71 92.07
1997 41.34 96.51 98.18 89.08 67.49 57.98 156.03 65.78
1998 41.34 97.90 103.81 93.08 68.72 89.21 217.27 79.99
1999 27.93 97.45 69.66 92.93 18.41 48.36 188.21 90.33
2000 31.21 96.80 79.13 92.18 7.76 44.57 209.38 48.66
2001 27.13 96.65 71.90 93.07 8.62 41.98 139.06 47.92
2002 25.24 97.85 68.80 92.90 7.99 48.65 122.84 97.12
2003 25.50 98.98 74.21 93.04 5.71 31.59 169.52 72.50
2004 30.22 97.89 91.30 94.16 8.10 32.92 174.05 47.99
Source: Federal Budget Secretariat.
The resource liberation power is also often used for leverage in parliamentary
negotiations. A typical situation in Brazilian political life is the governor of a state,
or some of its representatives, asking the federal treasury secretary or the finance
ministry to underwrite some federal project that benefits that particular state.
It is true that not all budgetary items are so vulnerable to political influence.
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For example, “Personnel Services and Benefits” is mandatory. Public servants in
Brazil have a constitutional guarantee that they will not be laid off or have their
wages reduced. In this way the budget must be observed precisely with respect
to this class of spending. This means that, from the point of view of the federal
government, wages and benefits to public servants are fixed and compulsory. From
the point of view of the states, they are federal transfers since some states have
many more federal personnel than others11. In the empirical exercise in Chapter 5,
this item will be added to the constitutional funds in order to form what will be
called “Compulsory Transfers”.
The items “Contractual Services and Supplies” and “Acquisition of Capital
Assets” are different since the process of execution of the budget gives to the federal
government complete discretion over these types of spending. Because of this, they
will compose, together with the “Voluntary Grants”, the “Discretionary Resource
Transfers” which will be the federal government reaction function in the model in
Chapter 4 and the endogenous variable in the estimation in Chapter 5.
The “Interest, Dividends and Debt Repayment” will be considered neither in
the modeling chapter nor in the estimation since it is virtually impossible to assign
the regional distribution of this item.
The approach utilized in this work is somewhat different from that found in
Rodden and Arreteche (2003). They used total transfers and total discretionary
transfers as endogenous variables, but in both cases they did not consider the com-
11 For example, in the year 2001 the spending with federal personnel in Rio de Janeiro State is
1.8 billions dollars, while in São Paulo State it is 0.7 billions dollars, although São Paulo has more
than two times Rio de Janeiro population.
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pulsory transfers as an exogenous variable. By not doing so, they are not able to
disentangle the adjustment process made by the federal government in the transfer
system.
3.5 State Debts and Bailouts
The management of the state and municipal debts has been a major problem
not only for the proper functioning of Brazilian federalism, but also for the stabiliza-
tion of the National economy as a whole. The successive bailouts and an eventual
open default have hurt both Brazilian federalism and the economy through at least
two main effects.
First, they create a negative incentive for states and municipalities because
they encourage them to take on more debt and to default. Second, as the federal
government has issued bonds in order to buy back state debt, the central government
will have to pay this new debt service with its own resources which implies an
additional burden for the federal government if states default.
Brazilian federative unit debts are very peculiar in a number of aspects. First of
all, they are primarily composed of intergovernmental debt. The federal government
holds 84% of the total state and municipality liabilities which have reached around
130 billion dollars in 2003, which corresponds to 25% of that year’s National GDP.
The central government became their main creditor because it switched state and
municipality debt for its own bonds in order to preserve private investors from state
debt default.
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A second aspect of the intergovernmental debt in Brazil is that it is highly
concentrated. The four greatest debtors, coincidentally or not, the four largest
states, accumulate more than 65% of the total debt, which is proportional to state
GNP but not to their populations.
Another interesting fact about the intergovernmental debt in Brazil is that
it grows basically because defaulting states are able, in general, to attach the un-
paid services to the principal. As observed by Rodden (2004), Dillinger (1997) and
Afonso e de Melo (2000), the efforts of the Cardoso12 administration to prevent
new borrowing by state governments were partially successful. The legislation has
evolved in order to make it more difficult for states and municipalities to have access
to new money.
The first step in this direction was the prohibition for states to contract debt
from their own banks in 1992. This law was issued after a debt crisis in which the
states ceased paying the loans contracted from their own banks. As the default could
hurt the private sector, since the states banks needed those payments in order to
honor their own obligations, the federal government was compelled to act. After this
episode, the central government has issued more rules in an attempt to prevent new
debt and to combat the bad incentives states and municipalities face. This effort
has culminated with the adoption of the “Fiscal Responsibility Law,”13 which may
seriously penalize gubernatorial and other executive officers at state and municipal
levels if they violate the law.
12 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former Brazilian president. Elected for his first term in 1995,
reelected for more four years in 1999.
13 Supplementary Law 101, edited on May 04, 2000.
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It is interesting to notice that the set of laws and regulations to discipline state
and municipality debt activities has had little effect on the already existing debt
which in most cases has been renegotiated in favor of the debtors. This observation
leads to the last point to be highlighted about Brazilian intergovernmental debt.
Most Brazilians, including some Federal and state officials and legislators, consider
the debt impossible to pay. The state debts alone add up to 100 billion dollars14
which corresponds to 179% of their net current revenues. The situation is worse for
the major debtors, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul,
where this proportion is greater than 200%. Moreover, these four state capitals own
more than 15 billion dollars of debt alone.
This belief that the intergovernmental debt is not payable changes the nature of
the debt. One can view it as a perpetuity in which the principal will never be repaid.
From this perspective, renegotiations and bailouts of the state and municipality debt
are indeed negotiations that have the explicit objective of increasing the spending
resources to these federation units.
The modeling strategy in this case will be to consider only service payments in
state budget constraints, since the principal will not be repaid and will be considered
a perpetuity. Under this approach, any reduction in the debt service payments or
interest capitalization corresponds to a reduction of the implicit interest rate over
the state debt. There are two advantages of this approach: empirically, it does not
require the use of data about each government debt which would be very hard to
obtain in the case of the municipalities, and theoretically it avoids an intertemporal
14 Brazilian Treasury Secretariat, December 2003.
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model which may not produce clearly testable hypotheses.
3.6 Political and Legislative Issues
Brazil is a presidential republic in which the legislature is divided into two
houses. The lower house, the “Câmara dos Deputados”, is equivalent to the US
“House of Representatives” and performs a similar role, with 513 representatives
from the 26 states and from the Federal District. Each one of them has a four
year term; and there are no term limits. One of the characteristics of the lower
house is that the number of deputies by state is not meant to be proportional to the
population; less populated states have proportionally more representatives than the
more populated states.
For example, São Paulo State has a population of nearly 39 million people,
which are represented by 70 deputies. This means that each deputy from that state
represents around 553 thousand citizens (or 367 thousand voters from that state).
The situation of the Northern state of Roraima is quite different. In that state
357 thousand citizens are represented by 8 deputies which produces a ratio of one
representative for less than 45 thousand people (or 26 thousand voters).
The sub-representation problem is aggravated still further in the upper house,
the “Senado Federal”. In this chamber, each state has three seats independently of
its population. There are two types of senators, which only differ from one another
by the length of their term. Two thirds of them have an eight year term, while the
remaining one third have a shorter four year term.
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Senators have, in general, important links with their origin state’s executive
branch. As observed by Samuels (2000, 2003) the majority of the senators in Brazil
were (or wished to be) state governors and many of them helped to elect their succes-
sor before becoming congressmen. As pointed out by Rodden (2004) this intimate
relationship of the senators with the state governments creates an environment in
which the Senate has major obstacles in performing its constitutional function of
supervising state and municipality debt.
An important characteristic of the Brazilian legislature is that congressmen,
both deputies and senators, have a lower level of party fidelity. They tend to be more
loyal to their own state’s interests or to their direct voters than to ideology or party
decisions [see Rodden and Arreteche (2003)]. This pattern of political behavior has
been explained by historical circumstances [Schwartzman (1982)] and by the analysis
of the Brazilian electoral legislation, which favors this type of behavior since there
is no penalty for voting against party orientation or for party switching even after
elections.
The relationship of the Congress with the executive branch is quite tight in
Brazil. On the one hand, the executive may punish or reward individuals or groups
of congressmen by authorizing or withholding expenditures in their interest, or by
hiring or rejecting their political allies for public positions. On the other hand,
Congressmen may vote for or against the government’s proposals.
Because of these facts, governance in Brazil is a difficult process. Even if the
party of the president has a robust majority in the Congress, which is an unlikely
situation, the executive does not have automatic control of the legislative process,
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since it has to build coalitions with regional representatives in order to approve its
bills.
For most of the projects the executive needs a simple majority for approval.
However, constitutional amendments need a super-majority of two thirds and must
be voted in two rounds by both houses. The executive branch has expended much
effort on changing the Constitution in order to improve economic performance since
some of its articles lead to economic distortions. Thus, although Brazil is not a
parliamentary country, the Brazilian president may become very weak if he does
not satisfy the appetite of the congressmen for regional programs.
If the federal government needs the votes of the states’ representatives, it may
try to co-opt them by distributing discretionary resources. As congressmen tend
to vote in groups by state, this distribution of resources may be related to the
decisiveness of each state in this process. This feature will be dealt with in the next
chapter’s model by the introduction of pivotal probabilities [see Seabright (1996)].
The pivotal probability of each state is a measure of how likely the support of
its congressmen will be decisive to obtain parliamentary approvals; i.e. what is the
probability that the federal government will regret not having the support of a given
state. Conceptually, the pivotal probability of a given state is the difference between
the probability that the central government obtains a congressional majority with
the support of the state in question and the probability that it obtains a majority
even without the support of that state.
Brazil has 27 federation units (including the Federal District) and each of them
may vote for or against the federal government. In order to calculate the pivotal
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probability of a state, it is necessary to enumerate each possible combination of states
votes (there are 227 = 134, 217, 728) and to count those combinations in which the
federal government obtains a victory with the state support and those combinations
in which the federal government wins in spite of the state opposition. Subtracting
the latter from the former and dividing the result by the total number of possible
combinations, one obtains the pivotal probability of the state. Of course each state
has a different number of representatives and voters and this difference must be
considered when calculating the winner combinations. The algorithm for calculating
Brazilian states pivotal probabilities is described in Appendix A, while Table 3.9
shows the political representation and power of each Brazilian state, including the
pivotal probabilities as a measure of state representative decisiveness.
In the calculation of the pivotal probabilities , it is assumed that states have no
ideological preferences, i.e., their vote is totally based on the satisfaction of their own
preferences for goods and services. It is clear that if the federal government takes into
consideration state pivotal probability when deciding about resource redistribution,
it is acting not as a purely benevolent central planner, but as a self-interested agent.
If the government is self-interested, principal-agent problems may arise. In the
econometric exercise of Chapter 5, the self-interested government hypothesis will be

















São Paulo 38,178 25,656 73 522,983 351,446 0.2222
Minas Gerais 18,344 12,681 56 327,563 226,439 0.1606
Rio de Janeiro 14,724 10,214 49 300,499 208,439 0.1389
Bahia 13,323 8,569 42 317,219 204,014 0.1175
Rio Grande do Sul 10,409 7,352 34 306,134 216,239 0.0943
Paraná 9,798 6,663 33 296,909 201,921 0.0914
Pernambuco 8,085 5,397 28 288,738 192,738 0.0773
Ceará 7,655 4,805 25 306,181 192,210 0.0687
Pará 6,454 3,818 20 322,684 190,899 0.0548
Maranhão 5,803 3,569 21 276,344 169,968 0.0576
Santa Catarina 5,528 3,392 19 290,932 178,517 0.0520
Goiás 5,210 3,366 20 260,517 168,292 0.0548
Paráıba 3,495 2,322 15 232,993 154,805 0.0409
Esṕırito Santo 3,202 2,146 13 246,286 165,110 0.0355
Amazonas 2,962 1,917 11 269,255 174,307 0.0300
Piaúı 2,898 1,848 13 222,940 142,176 0.0355
Alagoas 2,888 1,730 12 240,628 144,169 0.0328
Rio Grande do Norte 2,853 1,600 11 259,344 145,463 0.0300
Mato Grosso 2,605 1,525 11 236,795 138,612 0.0300
Distrito Federal 2,146 1,518 11 195,076 138,040 0.0300
Mato Grosso do Sul 2,141 1,412 11 194,602 128,343 0.0300
Sergipe 1,846 1,148 11 167,822 104,358 0.0300
Rondônia 1,432 883 11 130,162 80,231 0.0300
Tocantins 1,207 785 11 109,729 71,400 0.0300
Acre 587 370 11 53,358 33,617 0.0300
Amapá 517 290 11 46,956 26,373 0.0300
Rorâima 347 209 11 31,534 18,957 0.0300
Total 174,633 115,184 594 293,995 193,913
Source: Federal Electoral Court.
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Chapter 4
Discretionary Resources in the Brazilian Federation: A
Theoretical Model
4.1 Models of Federative Resource Redistribution
Federative relationships among different government tiers have been a central
source of economic problems, as well as an obstacle to the their solution, not only
in Brazil but also in other federative Latin America countries. Conflicts between
municipal, state and federal governments1 are present in a number of aspects of
these federations: which government layer is assigned to collect (or appropriate)
tax revenues; how the money from privatization of state-owned enterprises should
be divided between local and federal governments; what the criteria should be for
voluntary grants distribution, and so on.
This chapter investigates, at a theoretical level, some of the major institutions
that comprise the Brazilian federalism. In particular, it focuses on the consequences
of the distribution of discretionary resources from the federal government. Discre-
tionary resources are defined as those resources from the central government that are
applied within the limits of a state or municipality without any legal or federative
1 Throughout this chapter state and municipal governments will be aggregated as local gov-
ernments. Thus, it will be assumed that all the municipalities within a state, as well as the state
government, act as if they were an integrated federative unit. This assumption allows us to use a
two layer government model.
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obligation, i.e., those resources that are settled exclusively by federal government
will. The definition of discretionary resources includes the Voluntary Grants which
are cash transfers to local governments to be used at their discretion as well as all
other direct application of resources made at the discretion of the federal government
in the state territory.
This work is primarily concerned with the determination of the distribution of
discretionary resources, in particular with the possibility that local governments may
induce, by economic and political means, the federal government to increase their
grants. A related question is whether or not the institutional design of the Brazilian
federalism provides the right incentives to states and municipalities to be fiscally
responsible. For example, do local governments face the true social benefits and
costs of reducing their tax burdens? Do they have incentives to adopt a responsible
debt policy?
The impact of the existing compulsory equalization grants on the allocation
of discretionary resources is also a relationship to be studied in this chapter. The
point here is to determine if discretionary transfers have an offsetting effect relative
to the equalization grants as legally defined.
This study approaches some questions of great interest for the Brazilian federa-
tive structure. For instance, if the federal government can be induced to compensate
local governments, the latter will face an SBC, since bad fiscal performance will lead
to federal bailouts under the form of increased federal resource transfers. The ex-
istence of an SBC for local governments may have practical consequences for the
operation of the fiscal federation. The first of them would be a low level of fiscal
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responsibility. For example, if greater debt service payments by local governments
are followed by greater discretionary resources transfers to them, there is a clear
incentive to issue debt over what would be efficient.
In the context of the Brazilian federalism, the SBC may create benefits to
states from forgoing local taxation. If the federal government compensates local
governments when their tax collection decreases, the opportunity cost of an addi-
tional unit of private consumption faced by states, measured by the forgone tax
collection, will be smaller than the real (collective) opportunity cost. As a conse-
quence of this process states have an incentive to cut their tax rate even if it leads
to a decline in tax collection. This process is known in Brazil as the “fiscal war”
among states.
Another concern is related to the functioning of the equalization grants, which
are supposed to reduce inter-regional disparities and may be seriously affected in the
presence of compensatory discretionary transfers. If states that receive lower levels
of constitutional (compulsory) grants are able to extract a compensatory amount
from the federal government, the intended effect of those compulsory grants will be
reduced.
The last objective of this chapter is to explore the existence of principal-
agent problems that may arise where the interests of the federal government are not
coincident with those of the federate units. Even if one accepts the existence of this
kind of problem, can it explain the inefficiencies associated with the distribution of
the discretionary resources among the federative units?
Thus, it is also necessary to determine if the existence of SBCs and other fiscal
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inefficiencies are due to delegation problems or if they result from the design of
resource transfer mechanisms. This diagnostic is important because the appropriate
policies for dealing with a principal-agent problem emanating from some delegation
system are quite different from those necessary to remedy a situation in which the
mechanism for federal resource reallocation is not efficient.
If the federal government pursues its own interests, it will try to maximize
a function that is not directly related to the states’ well-being. For example, the
federal government may maximize its chances of re-election or the probability of
obtaining a congressional majority.
At this point a principal− agent problem may arise. The federal government
is supposed to use its power on behalf of the well-being of the states, but it may
have its own agenda. In this case, the states (principals) delegate some decision
power to the federal government (agent), but the latter may have objectives that
differ from those of the former. It is necessary to examine the consequences of this
federal government self-interested behavior, the magnitude of its effects over the
states’ well-being, and if it is a major source of inefficiencies in the model.
The existence of a principal-agent problem is to be detected by empirical in-
vestigation (chapter 5), but its consequences and its importance may be inferred
at a theoretical level. Do all inefficiencies associated with a principal-agent prob-
lem vanish when a benevolent federal government replaces a self-interested one, or
will such inefficiencies come from somewhere else and are merely aggravated by the
principal-agent effect? The answer to this question may be used to determine the
appropriate policies to improve the performance of the Brazilian federation, since
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if the major inefficiency problem comes from a principal-agent problem, the better
measures to deal with it (improvement of the states’ control over the federal gov-
ernment, increase of the federal government accountability, etc.) are quite different
from those necessary to correct a badly conceived federation design.
4.2 Structure of the Model
In this section, I will develop a model of the distribution of federal resources,
inspired by Goodspeed (2002), in which the federal government taxes the entire
population of the country and redistributes the resources accordingly to a rule that
maximizes a concave sum of the utilities of the federate units. This altruistic central
government is instituted because it has better information about the situation of
the other units than any unit in particular. The main objective is to derive the
reaction function of the federal government as well as its derivatives with respect to
variables controlled by local governments.
A second model will be developed in the next section using the concept of ac-
countability [Seabright (1996)] in order to describe the behavior of a self-interested,
vote-seeking government. After obtaining the reaction function of such a govern-
ment, it will be contrasted with the altruistic-government’s function to determine
the consequences of a principal-agent problem and their importance to the states’
well-being.
The model developed in this chapter is similar to that found in Goodspeed
(2002), but it has at least two important differences. First of all, it considers a
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one-period problem while Goodspeed’s is a two-period model. Secondly, this model
specifies the reelection mechanism through which the federal government is chosen
or defeated. In order to describe such a process the concept of pivotal probability
is utilized [Seabright (1996)]. Pivotal probability is defined as the probability that
one particular state is decisive in the electoral process.
The modifications of Goodspeed’s model are driven by two main reasons: to
establish a closed-form solution for the federal government discretionary grants re-
action function and to define specifically the electoral process for the federal gov-
ernment.
There are m localities, each one inhabited by ηi (i = 1, 2, ..., m) individuals
with homogeneous tastes2. Each state has a representative agent’s additive utility
function, which depends on the consumption of a public and a private good and on
an idiosyncratic shock, as in the equation (4.1) below, where Ci is the per capita
consumption of the private good in region i, Gi is the per capita consumption of
the public good in region i and ei ∼ F [0; σi] is the idiosyncratic shock that occurs
in region i.
Ui(Ci, Gi) = ui(Ci) + zi(Gi) + ei (4.1)
where u′i, z
′




i < 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
The idiosyncratic shocks may be interpreted as a judgment made by the popu-
2It is assumed here that the “Tiebout process” of grouping individuals with similar tastes into
communities has been already in effect. This assumption allows the utilization of the representative
agent for each region.
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lation over non-economic aspects of the government (for example, its foreign affairs
performance or the perceived level of corruption3).
States do not have perfect information about the real situation of the other
states. In particular, they cannot observe the realization of the shock e in the
other states. Thus, they must delegate power to the federal government in order
to redistribute income across states. The central government might have its own
motivation and may not act in the interest of the federation, as will be seen in a
later section of this chapter.
In this version, externalities are allowed neither in the public nor in the private
good. Although their importance has been recognized in allocative government
decisions4, they would make the model much more complex without a corresponding
gain in intuition.
Both local and federal governments provide local public goods. Federal provi-
sion is a perfect substitute for local provision5. The sources to finance local public
good expenditures (Gi) are three: local tax collection T
C
i , compulsory grants gci and
discretionary resource transfers gvi from the federal government. This last category
includes direct federal local public good expenditures. These sources are used not
only to finance the public good provision, but also to service Si, local perpetual debt.
Taking this relation in per capita terms, one could write down the state government
budget constraint as:
3In Brazil we humorously say that the chances of re-election of an incumbent government
increase if the national soccer team performs well.
4See for example Wildasin (1997).
5 This is an assumption that is not too strong for the Brazilian case, since there is a substantial




i + gci + gvi − Si (4.2)
Since in Brazil the main local tax is a consumption, origin based tax, per capita
local tax collection in locality i, TCi , depends on all other states’ income (besides
the own state income). Let αij be the proportion of state i income that is spent on
products and services produced in state j6. Then, state i per capita tax collection







where τi is the local tax rate and Yk is the state k per capita income.
States’ per capita income, Yi are random. Each state knows its own value
before acting, but it does not possess exact information about other states’ income.
The federal government knows the per capita income realization of all states. Thus,
the federal government could operate a regional insurance system in which transfers
go from the states with better income realizations to those with poorer ones.
Another constraint in the model is the one faced by private consumers in each
locality. The private consumption in each locality must be equal to private income
after federal and local taxes. Federal government taxes income and each state taxes
consumption at a different tax rate. As there is no private savings in this model,
private consumption will equal to disposable income. In this case, one could write
down the following constraint for private consumption:
6The supposition that αij is fixed implies a perfectly inelastic consumption. This means that
the consumers will bear the whole tax burden.
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Ci = (1− τc)Yi − T pi (4.4)
where τc is the federal income tax rate and T
p
i is the per capita tax payments made
by state i citizens to local governments. Notice that T pi is, in general, different from




i , while net importers will have the inverse
situation.
Per capita local tax payments depend on a combination of different states’ tax





The last equation to be considered is the federal government budget constraint.
It establishes that, in absolute terms, the total sum of the discretionary transfers of







It is worth noting that there is no constraint for the compulsory grants gck .
This is so because, as in Goodspeed (2002), they are treated as exogenous and their
financing is provided by a separate fund over which neither the federal nor the state
government has any control; the distribution of these funds is legally established.
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4.3 Benevolent Central Planner Solution
In this section the federal government is supposed to act in accordance with the
state collective will, i.e., federal government uses all available information from the
localities to maximize their collective welfare. In this case, there is no principal-agent
problem involved. The federal government (agent) uses all available information
from the states (principals) to maximize their collective welfare.
In order to establish the first-best solution to the model, one may derive the
behavior of a benevolent central planner who coordinates the actions of the federal
government with those of the states. In this case, the federal government observes
the realizations of each state income and chooses the values of the local tax rates (τi),
federal tax rate (τc) and federal resources voluntary transfers (gvi). This benevolent





: UT = E
m∑
k=1
ηk[uk(Ck) + zk(Gk) + ek]
S.t. : (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6)
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is the share of state i income in the
national income.
This formula resembles Samuelson’s condition for efficient provision of public
goods, but its interpretation is somewhat different. First, observe that the public
goods here are local and thus they do not preserve the characteristic of being non-
rival across states; consumption in one state precludes the consumption of others.
The Samuelson condition is derived from the fact that one more unit of a public
good benefits all consumers and as a consequence its marginal utility must equal the
sum of the marginal utilities of the private consumption good across consumers. In
our model, the additional provision of the local public good zi does not benefit any
consumer outside state i. Because of this, despite the resemblance equation (4.11)
is not the Samuelson condition for efficient public good provision7.
From the system of 2m equations comprised of the set of equations (4.9) and
7As will be seen in the next section equation (4.11) holds even when the provision is not efficient.
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(4.11) it is possible to determine the values for gvi and τi (2m values). From con-
straint (4.6) the federal tax rate tc is obtained. Besides from equations (4.11) one





We use this result to obtain a parametric solution for the set of equations (4.9).
Notice that, at this point, this set of equations has m equations and m variables
(the u′s). This guarantees a unique solution, provided that the equations are not





The conclusion is that in the totally centralized solution the benevolent central
planner will equalize the marginal utilities of the consumption of the public and the
private good across states, i.e., u′1 = u
′






2 = . . . = z
′
m. Given
the concavity of the functions u(•) and z(•) and given the total distributive power
of the central government this result is to be expected. In this case, the benevolent
central government promotes a totally egalitarian federation, which maximizes the
concave sum of states’ utilities.
4.4 Decentralized Federation
In a decentralized federation local governments have autonomy to decide about
some fiscal issues that affect their constituents. In the model of this section we
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assume that local governments establish the local tax rate (τi) and use the revenues
to supply the local public good (Gi). The federal government keeps its prerogative
of national taxation and can also supply a complementary amount of the local public
good. In this setup, the federal government does not have total distributive power
anymore since it must tax income at the same rate across states.
The whole process may be described as follows. First, local governments,
knowing the realization of their own income, decide about the per capita local tax
rate (τi), and possibly about the per capita debt services payment (Si). Per capita
compulsory grants for each locality (gci) are public information and are known before
state and individual decisions.
Central government observes their actions, as well as each state per capita
incomes (Yi), and chooses the federal income tax rate (τc) and the amount and
distribution of the per capita discretionary resources (gvi). Then individuals in
each locality decide about gross per capita consumption spending (Ci). Finally the
idiosyncratic shock (ei) occurs.
This is a sequential game in which states act first and must foresee the actions
of the federal government, which plays after having observed state moves. States
must apply backward induction while formulating their policies.
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S.t. : (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6)
(P2)






As the set of equation (4.14) shows, the federal government will try to equalize
the marginal utilities in the consumption of the public goods across states, but now
it has only the voluntary transfers as instruments to do so. Furthermore, in order to
increase the voluntary transfers to a state, the federal government must increase its
tax rate, which causes a decrease in private consumption in all states, including the
state to be benefited. This reduces the distributive power of the central government
because it can not control each state’s private consumption anymore, although it
retains the control over aggregate private consumption.
With this set of equations in hand, it is possible to evaluate the impact of
the variables with regard to the propensity of the central government in supplying
discretionary resource transfers to state governments. The main question here is
how the federal government will react in the distribution of the discretionary re-
sources when states change their choice variables. With this analysis, one could
evaluate which specific policies of the federal government are consistent. For ex-
ample, Brazilian federal government has been engaged in policies to stop economic
wars among federate units. One pertinent question in this context would be: what
is the real opportunity cost for the states in lowering their tax burden? If they
are partially compensated by an increase in discretionary resource transfers when
they reduce their tributary burden, the local social cost expressed by a reduction in
public goods provision will be also lowered.
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Thus, the main objective of this section is to evaluate the properties of the
federal discretionary transfer reaction function, with special interest in its behavior
in relation to the states’ control variables.
As a first exercise one might examine the impact of the state tax rate on the
















Supposing that all states have the same preferences, i.e., ui = uj and zi = zj
for all i, j = 1, ...,m, then z′i = z
′













































































































Observe that z′′i < 0,
N−ηi
Υ





kYk < 0 since
it is a summation of negative numbers,
m∑
k=1
ηkαkiYk > 0 and αiiu
′′
i YiΥi < 0.
This implies that ∂gvi/∂τi < 0, which means that decreases in the tax rate
by a state will lead to increases in federal discretionary transfers to that state.
Whether it will be greater or smaller than -1 depends on, among other things,
the population of the state ηi. Curiously, the smaller its population, the larger
the increase in per capita federal discretionary resource transfers promoted by a
decrease in state taxes. This happens because it is relatively cheap to compensate
small states. Furthermore, the smaller the state, the less it participates in the
financing of its own supplementary funds. If a high population state cuts its tax
collection, a big part of the compensation must come from the state itself, unless
the federal government is willing to place a greater burden on the other states.
It is worth noting that there are constraints that force the federal government
to increase discretionary transfers to a state when the latter decreases its tax rate.
In this model, when a state cuts its tax rate, the state tax burden decreases since
the states’ income are supposed to be exogenous. A decrease in the state tax burden
leads, on one hand, to more disposable income and to more private consumption. On
the other hand, this diminishing tax collection constrains the provision of the local
public good. This imbalance between private consumption and local public good
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consumption reduces the state’s level of utility. The federal government increases
discretionary transfers to that state in order to restore, at least partially, the ideal
proportion between public and private good consumptions. The federal government
realizes that if it taxes all states a little more, there will be imbalances in the other
states too, but the reduction in the imbalance in the receiving state will produce
a compensatory increase in the federation welfare. At the end of such a process,
the state in question obtains more private consumption, since it has reduced its tax
burden, and it is at least partially compensated by the decrease in the local public
good provision. Summarizing, there is time inconsistency in the solution of the
problem: ex-ante it is better for the federation if the federal government does not
act in order to restore the proportion between private and public good consumption,
but ex-post, when the federal government faces a such imbalances as a fait accompli,
as defined by Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), the federation as a whole will be better
off if the federal government tries to correct the problem.
Applied to the Brazilian case, this result may help to explain the aversion
of the more populated states to fiscal wars. When state taxation declines, federal
grants to the state increase but they increase more in per capita terms in the less
populated states. As the financing of the grants are to be shared equally among all
states in per capita terms, those states which receive less are indeed losing resources.
Similar exercises will produce the following results in relation to the impact of










































. This equality reflects the fact that the central
government reaction function is equally affected by an increase of the compulsory
transfers or by a similar decrease in debt service payments.
Equation (4.19) shows that 0 < ∂gvi/∂Si < 1. This means that reductions
in the debt service payments will lead to less than proportional decreases in dis-
cretionary resource transfers from the federal government. Besides, the larger the
population of the state, the smaller the decrease. Thus, Brazilian state debt re-
structuring programs, in which states must adopt a number of fiscal disciplinary
measures in order to obtain more favorable interest rates over their debt, seem to
make sense since the big owners are also the more populated states. The reduction
in debt service payments will not be totally offset by a proportional reduction in dis-
cretionary resource transfers from the federal government. Such programs may have
negative distributive effects, since resources will be attracted by the most populated
states in per capita terms.
A negative relationship between compulsory grants and discretionary transfers
is detected in equation (4.20). It implies that, even in the case of a benevolent gov-
ernment, a priori redistributive schemes will be somewhat offset by the distribution
of discretionary transfers.
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The last part of this section examines the effects of this federal government
behavior over the decisions of the local governments. As said before, local govern-
ments act before the federal government, but they internalize the reaction function
of the latter in their decisions. As each local government tries to maximize its own






: Ui = E[ui(Ci) + zi(Gi) + ei]









ηkαkiYk + gvi + gci − Si
(P3)
The Lagrangean for this problem is:








ηkαkiYk + gvi + gci − Si] + ei} (4.21)


















Equation (4.22) says that, in general, the decentralized solution will not equal-
ize the marginal utilities from the private and from the public good consumption
and thus the decentralized solution will meet the first-best conditions only in spe-
cial cases. This divergence of the decentralized solution in relation to the first best
solution comes from two sources. First, there is the reaction function of the federal
government, which indicates that the federal government will help the localities with
insufficient provision of the local public good, even if this shortage is provoked by a
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deliberate reduction in the local tax collection.
Second, there is the problem of tax exports, which induces the exporter local-
ities to increase their tax rates, since a good part of the burden will be levied on
other localities’ citizens.
In order to isolate the first effect, one could examine a situation in which there






0 if i 6= j
1 if i = j

















the solution of the decentralized problem
becomes equivalent to the centralized one. In this case ui = uj = zi = zj, for all
i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The most plausible case in which this equality can occur is when both deriva-
tives are equal to zero. This means that the reaction function of the federal govern-
ment is totally insensitive to the states’ tax rate. In this case (with no tax exports)
the decentralized solution would be equal to the centralized, first-best solution.
This is a strong result because it implies that the achievement of the first-
best solution may be a question of credible commitment. If the federal government
can credibly commit to not help local governments when they reduce their tax
rate, the latter have no incentive for doing so since a decrease in the tax collection
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and a consequent reduction in the provision of the local public good would not be
compensated by a higher level of voluntary resource transfers. At the end of the
day the local population would obtain a sub-optimal bundle of public and private
consumption goods.





6= 0, the relation between the marginal utilities
from the consumption of the private and of the public goods depend essentially on
whether ∂τc
∂τi
Yi, the variation in the federal tax collection in state i caused by an
increase in the state tax rate, is greater or smaller than ∂gvi
∂τi
, the reduction in the






then z′i > u
′
i, which means that locality i consumes too much of
the private good and too little of the public good relative to the first-best outcome.
The interpretation goes as follows: on the one hand, if an additional increase in the
local tax rate provokes a reduction in the federal voluntary transfers which is greater
than the reduction in the federal tax collection within the locality, local government
will fall short in the local tax rate and in the provision of the local public good. On
the other hand, the smaller local tax rate implies more disposable income and thus,
more private consumption.
But what is the profile of the locality in which this case is most likely to
happen? First observe that, in the case of no local tax exports, from equation
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ηk > ηi ⇒ N − ηi > 0.
As u′′i and z
′′
i are both negative, then:











is that NYi < Υ, since in this case
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States with per capita income above the average will consume too much public










⇒ NȲ = Υ
thus, if Yi > Ȳ ⇒ NYi > Υ ⇒ (NYi −Υ)u′′i Υi < 0.
The conclusion of all this is that the greater the per capita income of a lo-
cality, the greater its public good consumption and the smaller its private good
consumption in relation to the first-best optimum.
4.5 Vote-Seeking Central Government
And if the federal government is not a benevolent one? Suppose, for example,
that it is election-motivated, what would the difference be in its reaction functions
expressed by equations (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20)? What kind of inefficiencies would
arise from this principal-agent problem? Do these inefficiencies alter qualitatively
the results?
In order to answer these questions, one must first specify the objective function
of such a self-interested government. On one hand, in the Brazilian case, as discussed
in the last chapter, the federal government always needs support from states and
municipalities’ representatives in order to approve its legislative bills. In the last
instance, the federal government must maintain a winning coalitions in order to
remain in office. Thus, it is quite reasonable that the federal government’s objective
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is keeping a parliamentary majority in the congress, because without such a majority
the central government cannot satisfy the minimum governance condition.
On the other hand, as a democratic republican country, the incumbent federal
government is periodically subject to presidential elections. Thus another possible
objective of the federal government is to be re-elected or to have its candidate
elected.
In both cases, there is a principal-agent problem, since these objectives are
not directly coincident with the federation objective, which is the maximization of
the sum of the total utility of the federated localities. In this situation, the federal
government uses its voluntary resources transfer powers to co-opt localities’ votes.
Suppose that, as in Seabright (1996), there is a utility “cut level”, Q, in each
locality. If this minimum level is not achieved the locality is going to vote against
the federal government. In order to achieve its objectives (re-election or congres-
sional majority), the central government needs a simple majority. Each locality has
a different number of votes and they cast all of them in favor or against the federal
government; thus what is truly necessary for federal government to achieve its ob-
jective is a combination of satisfied localities that accounts for more than one half
of the votes.
Some observations regarding the electoral process are worthwhile at this point.
First observe that, as said above, in this model the voting rules are well defined.
If a locality reaches at least its reservation utility level, it will vote in favor of the
government; otherwise it will vote against it. There is also a notable difference be-
tween this model and Seabright’s, because in the latter it is implicitly assumed that
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all states have the same electoral weight. This fact becomes clear in the assumption
that to be re-elected the incumbent government needs the votes of at least K states
(any K states). Here, differences in the electoral power of the localities are allowed.
Furthermore, in Seabright’s model the policy implementation is costly to the
central government, while in this paper the implementation (or the expansion) of
a policy has no direct effect in the central government’s objective function. It only
affects central government because it changes its success probability8.
Thus, if the central government has its own objectives, which are not necessar-
ily coincident with its constituents’ aspirations, there is a principal-agent problem.
Localities (principal) cannot directly control the central government’s (agent) ac-
tions a priori, but they can replace it if they are not satisfied. There is also an
incomplete contract problem. As the idiosyncratic shock is not verifiable, it is not
possible to write down a contingent contract for every realization of e and thus no
pre-determined penalty against a government that frustrates the population can be
enforced.
The model is as follows. Let R represent the event in which the federal gov-
ernment obtains the majority of the votes and let Ri and Ri represent the events in
which locality i votes in favor of and against the incumbent government, respectively.
Thus, the Problem of the Central Government may be described as follows:
8 Indeed, the assumption that policy implementation is costly seems to be in opposition to most
of the literature. An increased level of central government intervention generally implies a larger







: Prob(Federal Government Approval) = P (R)
S.t. : (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6)
(P2)
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where Φk = P (R/Rk)− P (R/Rk).
The variable Φk above measures the probability that the votes from locality
k are decisive or pivotal for the federal government success and is obtained by the
difference between the probabilities of winning the ballot with and without locality
k’s votes.
Locality k will vote in favor of the federal government if, and only if, they
achieve at least the utility reservation level Q; thus the event Rk may be defined as:
Rk = {ek/uk(Ck) + zk(Ck) + ek > Q} (4.27)
or alternatively:
9 Details in Seabright (1996), Appendix I.
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Rk = {ek/ek > Q− uk(Ck)− zk(Ck)} (4.28)
Thus the probability of approval of the central government by locality k,





⇒ P (Rk) = 1− F [Q− uk(Ck)− zk(Ck)] (4.30)














i fork = i (4.32)









































Plugging equation (4.36) into equation (4.26) and then substituting into equa-

















for all i, j = 1, ..., m and where φi is the locality’s i per capita pivotal probability
index.
Equation (4.38) is in sharp contrast to its analogue in the benevolent central
planner case (equation 4.12). Supposing homogeneous preferences across states,
equation (4.12) says that in the latter case, the federal government will try to equal-
ize the per capita provision of the public good across states. Equation (4.38) indi-
cates, in contrast, that even if preferences are homogeneous, the federal government
will try, in general, to establish a larger provision of the public good in localities
where the per capita pivotal probability index is greater.10
The behavior of the reaction functions of the federal government to changes in
10 Of course the relation between public good provision and pivotal probability depends on the
shape of the probability function f , but as there is no a priori reason to assume that the function
value be greater in state i than in state j, the proposition is still fairly general.
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the exogenous parameters may be calculated in a way that is similar to the proce-
dures used in the last section. Thus, supposing that the idiosyncratic shocks in all







































































































In the cases of equations (4.40) and (4.41), the results are quite straightfor-
ward. Both derivatives are, in absolute terms, smaller than one. However, the
former is positive while the latter is negative. Both also have in common the fact
that the greater the population of the state (ηi), the smaller the magnitude in abso-
lute terms. These results are consistent with the central planner case (see equations
(4.19) and (4.20) above), but there is an interesting difference. In spite of the fact
that the discretionary transfers reaction function intensity is decreasing in the pop-
ulation of the state, it is increasing in its per capita pivotal probability, φi
11. As φi
has a concave relationship with the population (see Chapter 5 for details), it is not
clear that less populated states would face a weaker reaction function than others.
11 To be sure φi appears in both numerator and denominator of equations (4.40) and (4.41),
but as in these equations the numerators are smaller than the denominators an increase in φi will
cause a proportionally greater increase in the numerators.
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This fact is still stronger in equation (4.39), in which the per capita pivotal
probability appears again in the numerator. In this case the magnitude of the
reaction function could be indeed greater than unity in absolute value. It could
happen in states with a high per capita pivotal probability and a small population.
States with large populations will tend to be adverse to economic wars, since they
will be subjected to a lesser reduction in federal discretionary resource transfers
when they increase their taxes.
These results depend on the shape of the probability density function, but the
problem becomes virtually impossible to deal with if one considers other functions
besides the uniform distribution.
4.6 Delegation vs. Institutional Design Problem
As can be seen in the last two sections, the behavior of the central government,
benevolent or self-interested, only affects the results of the model to the extent that
it takes into account the electoral weight of the states. The signs of the derivatives
of the federal discretionary transfers reaction functions remain the same, but their
magnitudes vary when pivotal probabilities are introduced. This means that, in any
case, the existence of discretionary resource transfers in the Brazilian federation (at
least in the way they exist at the moment) will always be regarded by the states as
a compensatory mechanism in the provision of public goods.
Thus, the principal-agent problem that arises when the federal government is
self-interested aggravates the inefficiencies associated with the distribution of federal
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discretionary transfers, since the reaction functions of the benevolent central-planner
and those of the self-interested government differ from each other. Nonetheless, the
previous analysis finds that the differences between the reaction functions of the two
types of government are quantitative rather than qualitative, since the signs of their
derivatives remain the same. Even in the case of a benevolent central government,
there are incentives for states to over-borrow and to decrease their tax rates bellow
the appropriate level.
The quite obvious corollary from equations (4.39) to (4.41) is that reaction
functions will tend to be stronger in localities with greater political decisiveness (i.e.
pivotal probability) when the government is vote-seeking. This argument implies
that any eventual principal-agent problem emanating from an imperfect delegation
system is not the main cause of the distributional inefficiencies in the Brazilian
federation; the high level of discretion will generate such inefficiencies even when
the delegation problem is absent.
In practice, the theoretical differences between the actions of a self-interested
government and an altruistic one may be detected by empirical tests. In order to
perform such tests, one must specify the equation in which the federal voluntary
resource transfer amount to each state is the endogenous variable and include the
pivotal probability of each state among the exogenous variables. If the latter is not
significant, it means that the federal government is not self-interested since it does
not account for the political influence of the states when setting transfers.
But this chapter shows that whatever is the objective function of the central
government, the existence of federal discretionary resources will generate an SBC
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for local governments. It happens because local governments know that the federal
government has available a help mechanism. Thus, if local governments face fiscal
problems they may expect some kind of rescue from the central government either
because the latter is concerned with a fall in local populations’ wellbeing, or because
it knows that this fall would hurt its reelection probability. In either case, local
government could expect a relaxing in their budget constraint, which characterize
the existence of the SBC.
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Chapter 5
Discretionary Resources in the Brazilian Federation:
Empirical Tests
This chapter aims to test the theoretical model developed in the Chapter 4.
In order to do this, a simplified linear federal government reaction function will be
estimated and the direction of its responses to a number of exogenous variables will
be checked.
In the theoretical model, the federal behavior was obtained in a way in which
the direction of its reactions could be unambiguously determined. In this chapter,
the econometric procedures will try to see if this behavior can be observed empiri-
cally within the Brazilian federation.
5.1 Strategic Interactions between Governments: Empirical Issues
The existence of strategic behavior in the relationship among governments has
been tested in a number of studies including Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), Kelejian
and Robinson (1993), Keen (1997), Besley and Rosen (1998), Goodspeed (2000) and
Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001). Nonetheless, the focus of those papers is quite
distinct both because they deal with different types of fiscal externalities and because
they consider distinct levels of government interactions1.
1 Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), for example, use a model in which the endogenous variable is
the per capita expenditure of each state. Thus they are investigating horizontal fiscal interactions,
87
The typology of the fiscal externalities is done according to what is affected
by the government action. If a fiscal policy of a jurisdictional government impacts
directly the utility functions of the residents of others jurisdictions (e.g. pollution
abatement), this fiscal externality is said to be direct. But if it only affects other
governments’ budget constraints (e.g. tax competition), it is called an indirect
externality2.
An important feature of this classification is that, in spite of the conceptual
distinction, both models generate similar jurisdictional reaction functions and the
estimating process to be applied, and its difficulties, are quite the same.
Fiscal externalities can also be classified accordingly to the layers of govern-
ment that produce them. If the externality created by a jurisdictional government
affects governments of the same level, it is said to be a horizontal externality. If
instead, the externality impacts other government layers then it is classified as a
vertical externality.
As an example of a vertical fiscal externality, consider what happens when the
federal government raises its tax rate on a commodity, which is also taxed by the
states. Among other things, this increase in the federal tax will likely increase the
consumer price of the commodity in question. Higher consumer prices will reduce
the total unit sales of the good and, consequently, will reduce state tax collections.
while the central point of this dissertation is related to vertical fiscal interactions. Furthermore,
their model has spatial correlation in both the errors and the endogenous variable, while in this
dissertation the model to be estimated will deal only with residuals’ spatial dependence.
2 This nomenclature is compatible with Brueckner (2003) ‘spillover’ or ‘resource flow’ taxonomy.
Some authors, as Browning (1999) do not consider indirect externalities as genuine; they prefer to
classify them as “pecuniary” externalities.
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Thus, an increase in the federal tax rate will drive down state revenues.
Notice that all vertical externalities are indirect. This is because the federal
government cannot impact directly the utility functions of other same level juris-
dictions’ residents since by definition everybody in the country is under federal
jurisdiction. Of course, there may be international spillovers, but in this case they
would be classified as horizontal externalities since from the international perspec-
tive, federal governments play the role of state governments within the national
economy.
A point that is common to all of these models is that they are utilized to
estimate the reaction functions of the jurisdictions that interact as Cournot com-
petitors. Thus, in the case of the horizontal models, local government interaction
generates a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous game. In a vertical interactions
model, local government takes the actions of the central government as given and
interact with each other in a Cournot fashion.
The model estimated in this chapter is quite distinct; we analyze the reac-
tion function of the federal government in a Stackelberg game in which the central
government is the follower. As it will be seen below, most of the problems of the
Cournot-type models are also present in the estimation of this class of models.
The first of these empirical complexities is related to the endogeneity problem.
When modelling local government behavior, one must consider that the decisions
made by them take into account the decisions of the other governments. Thus,
a system of equations is needed and the variable in the LHS of one equation may
89
appear on the RHS of many other equations3. In order to deal with this econometric
issue two approaches are frequently suggested: the use of instrumental variables
in a two-stage least squares procedure or the application of maximum likelihood
methods.
In the case of the model estimated in this chapter, simultaneity is still a
complication but for other reasons. In a Stackelberg-type game, the leader plays
first but she foresees the move of the follower. Because of this, it would not be wrong
to consider that the follower’s action causes the leader’s choice, if retrospectively.
Of course, the leader’s move also helps to define what the follower will do. Thus, in
spite of the chronology in which they are made, the actions of both players influence
the decisions of the other. Because of this simultaneity, endogeneity problems need
to be taken into account.
For example, suppose the federal government (follower) aims to aid states that
have low taxation power. States (leaders, in this game) will take into consideration
this federal government motivation and may reduce local taxation expecting to get
more help from the central government. Thus, in the estimation of the federal
government aid reaction function, a simultaneity problem may appear: the federal
aid to a low taxation state is large because its taxation is low, or its taxation is low
because the local government counts on the federal aid.
Another source of inefficiency in OLS estimation may come from spatial cor-
relation in the residuals. In this case, the OLS estimators are still consistent but
not efficient. There are a number of possible channels through which the spatial
3 See Brueckner (2003) for a detailed discussion about this point.
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correlation might be transmitted to the equation errors. First, the residuals gener-
ating process may be the cause. In this model, known as the Spatial Errors Model
(SEM), all the correlation is due to a peculiar disturbance generating process4.
The spatial dependency may also come from the endogenous variables of other
spatial units. Thus the criminality index in one county, for example, depends not
only on that county’s income, but also on the neighboring counties’ income (Spatial
Durbin Model). It can still be treated in a Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR)
in which the values of some other spatial units’ endogenous variables appear as
explanatory variables in one unit’s equation.
Another possible channel through which the spatial correlation may be present
in the data occurs when the cross-sectional fixed effects show spatial dependence.
Suppose that spatial correlation appears neither in the residuals nor in the variables,
but the state intercepts are spatially dependent. In this case the fixed effect panel
estimation will produce residuals that are not spatially correlated, in spite of the
existence of some spatial dependence in the data.
In Appendix C these two effects are shown: first, if there is interest in de-
tecting spatial dependence and the estimation process is “Least Squares Dummy
Variables” (LSDV), it is necessary to test the spatial correlation of the intercepts,
since this correlation may not be present in the residuals. Secondly, if there is spatial
dependence in the intercepts and the model is estimated with OLS, this dependence
will appear in the residuals.
Heteroscedasticity is also a possible issue to be addressed in these estimations.
4 For a detailed discussion about spatial econometric and its applications, see LeSage (1999).
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It may arise from the fact that Brazilian states are heterogeneous in several aspects
as income, population, size of the public sector in proportion to the private sector,
etc. Furthermore, as the data will be utilized in per capita terms, the variance of
the residuals associated with the smaller states is expected to be greater than those
of the larger states, because small variations in the federal resources transferred to
the former may cause large variation in their per capita values.
As these sources of estimation inefficiencies, endogeneity, spatial dependence
and heteroscedasticity, are likely to appear in the data, section 5.3 summarizes the
procedures utilized to deal with them.
5.2 Data Set and Variables
Brazilian data collection and dissemination have evolved enormously in the
last decade. This evolution has two sources. First, the end of the very high inflation
rates allows analysts to be more confident about their precision. Second, the spread
of computers has made it easier to organize, disseminate and utilize the data.
One of the more interesting data sets that has been made available in this
process is the “Regionalization of the Public Sector Transactions” produced by the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics - IBGE. Although this data set dates
back to 1970, it used to be of very limited value since the regional appropriations
were contaminated by errors due to inflation and by the lack of operational capability
of processing the information.
This data set contains data on federal government expenditures and payments
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and by state. Thus, it is possible, with the proper aggregation of variables, to
estimate the reaction functions that rule the federal government distribution of
voluntary resources among the federated states.
In spite of the utility of this data set, some limitations still remain. The most
important among them is the fact that the expenditures assigned to the Federal
District 5 are inflated because most of the federal expenditures for which the proper
location cannot be precisely determined are appropriated in the Federal District.
This aggregation procedure produces problems of inconsistency in the data and
the solution for that, as will be seen in the next section, was the deletion of the
observations associated with the Federal District.
The aggregation of the original variables was done in order to group them
according to their nature and it did not necessarily respect the classification es-
tablished in the Brazilian public accounts. For example, the two sub items “Par-
ticipation Fund of the States” and “Capital Transfers” are both under the item
“Intergovernmental Transfers” but the former is a mandatory transfer and the lat-
ter is voluntary in most cases. Thus, they were used to compose distinct variables
in spite of the fact that both belong to the same item in the official accounts. In the
following paragraphs we describe the variables assembled to estimate the model; a
complete and detailed description of the variables can be found in Table 5.1.
The per capita “Discretionary Federal Resources Transfers” (DFT) includes
all discretionary expenditures and transfers made by the federal government to each
5The Federal District (Distrito Federal) is the federative unit which contains Brasilia, the Brazil-
ian capital. The Federal District is somewhat analogous to the District of Columbia in the US.
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Table 5.1:




Federal Tax Collection by State + Federal Social Security Tax Collection by State
+ Federal Civil Servant Social Security Tax Collection by State + Federal Patri-
monial Revenues by State + Repayment of Debt Loaned from the Federal Gov-
ernment by State
SR State Revenue State Tax Collection + State Social Security Tax Collection + State Civil Servant
Social Security Tax Collection + State Patrimonial Revenues + State Revenues
from Sales of Goods + State Revenues from Services + State Alienation of Goods




Municipal Tax Collection by State + Municipal Social Security Tax Collection by
State + Municipal Civil Servant Social Security Tax Collection by State + Mu-
nicipal Patrimonial Revenues by State + Municipal Revenues from Sales of Goods
by State + Municipal Revenues from Services by State + Municipal Alienation of
Goods by State + Repayment of Debt Loaned from the Municipal Government
by State + Municipal Credit Operations by State





Other Federal Expenditures by State +Federal Fixed Capital Expenditures by
State + Federal Other Transfers by State + Federal Capital Transfers by State
+ Federal Subsidies by State + Federal Financial Investments by State
FMT Federal Manda-
tory Transfers
Federal Personnel Payments by State + Federal Public Debt Payments by State +
Federal Social Security Payments by State + Federal Funds Transfers to State +
Federal Funds Transfers to State’s Municipalities + State Federal Matching Grant
for State Education + Municipal Federal Matching Grant for State Education
by State + State Participation in the Tax on Gold Transactions + Municipal
Participation in the Tax on Gold Transactions by State + State Participation
in the IPI over Exports + Municipal Participation in the Rural Property Tax by
State + Reimbursement to State for Exports VAT Desoneration + Reimbursement
to Municipalities for Exports VAT Desoneration by State + Federal Matching
Grant for State Health Expenditures + Federal Matching Grant for Municipalities
Health Expenditures by State
LDS Local Debt Ser-
vice
State Public Debt Payments + Municipal Public Debt Payments by State
POP Population State population
GDP State Gross Do-
mestic Product




Non-agriculture Share of the State GDP
VPIV State voters piv-
otal probability
State voters pivotal probability
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of the states and municipalities within the states, i.e., its composition considers
all those budgetary expenditures that are not compulsory or mandatory plus the
voluntary monetary transfers. Thus, by summing up the budgetary items “Federal
Capital Expenditures”, “Capital Transfers”, “Subsidies”, “Financial Investments”,
“Other Transfers” and “Other Expenditures,” one obtains the DFT. This variable,
as well as all other monetary values have been deflated by the Brazilian General
Price Index (IGP-DI), which includes the prices of a wide range of products from
raw materials to final consumption goods. Notice that the constitutional funds FPM
and FPE are not included in this variable.
The per capita “Local Government Own Revenues” (LR) is composed of the
total revenues that both states and municipalities collect by themselves. It includes
all state and municipalities’ tax collections (including social security taxes), patri-
monial revenues, revenues from sales of goods and services, repayment of loans and
credit operations contracted with the federal government or with private institu-
tions. The per capita “Local Government Debt Services” (LDS) is the sum of the
per capita debt payment of a state and of the municipalities within the state.
In order to obtain the per capita “Net Mandatory Federal Resources Trans-
fers” (NMFT) to states, we summed all the compulsory monetary transfers (FPE,
FPM, federal matching grants for state education and for health services, state and
municipal participation in the tax on gold transactions , state and municipal reim-
bursements for export tax exemptions and other state and municipal participation
in federal tax collection6), and the direct payments that the federal government
6For example, states have rights over the federal IPI over exports, and municipalities over the
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must compulsorily make within a state like federal personnel salaries, social security
payments and public debt payments. From this sum we subtract the total federal
tax collection within the state in order to obtain the net transfers.
Besides the use of the per capita “State Gross Domestic Product” (SGDP),
we also use the sum of the per capita industrial and the service product of the states
(ISSGDP) in the instrument estimation.
The last exogenous variable utilized in the estimations was the “State Voters
Pivotal Probability” (SVPP) which measures the decisiveness of state voters in the
reelection of an incumbent president.
5.3 Estimation Procedures
The first step in the estimation procedure was to fit the data with a Dummy
Variable Least Squares (DVLS) model. The likely existence of both time and cross
sectional effects suggested the utilization of a panel data model. The model utilized
to fit the data is described by equation (5.1) below.
DFTit = αi+γt+β1LRit+β2NMFTit+β3LDSit+β4SGDPit+β5SV PPit+εit (5.1)
In (5.1) αi is the cross-sectional effect of state i, γt the time effect of year t,
the βk’s are the coefficient associated with each exogenous variable and εit is the
true error associated with the tth observation of the ith cross-section unit.
The data set utilized in the estimation may be considered a ‘typical panel’
in the sense that the cross-section units greatly outnumber the time-series units.
federal rural property tax.
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As such, most of the methods used to deal with serial autocorrelation have their
powers strongly undermined. Because of this, we concentrated in the modelling on
heterogeneity among the cross-section units and somewhat neglected the possible
autocorrelation effects.
After the first DVLS estimation was done, some robustness tests were per-
formed in order to detect the presence of influential observations. First, following
the methodology suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), the “Studentized”







where e∗i is the ith “studentized” residual, ei is the ith regression residual, s(i) is
the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression when the ith observation is
deleted and hi is the the ith term of the diagonal of the matrix H = X(X
′X)X ′.
Each one of the “studentized” residuals is distributed according to a t distri-
bution with n − k degrees of freedom, where n is the number of observations and
k the number of endogenous variables utilized in the estimation. Following Belsley,
Khu and Welsch (1980), residuals that lie outside of the two standard deviation
range are possibly associated with influential observations.
The “studentized” residuals are shown in figure 5.1. As can be seen in this
figure, there are six points that break the two standard deviation barrier and among
them, four out of six come from observations associated with the Federal District
(state number 53).
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This evidence suggests that the observations from that federative unit have a
large influence on the estimation. This influence may be explained by the fact that
the Federal District appropriates all those expenditures to which there is no precise
determination of the location where they effectively occurred. In order to test the
hypothesis that Federal District data is driving the results, a “change of fit” test7
was performed. This test consists of deleting all observations from one unit and
calculating the following test statistics:
MDFFITm = [b− b(m)]′ X(m)′X(m) [b− b(m)]
where b are the estimated coefficients of the original regression, b(m) are the esti-
mated coefficients of the regression in which the m supposed influential observations
were deleted. If the MDFFITm is greater than 2
√
k/n, the deleted observations
may be considered influential with respect to the overall regression results.
In the case considered, in which n = 162 and k = 37 (considering all dummy
variables), the critical value is 0.97402. There were four cases in which the MDFFITm
were greater than the critical value, among them the most notable was the Federal
District where MDFFITDF = 103.48.
The next step was the calculation of the “studentized” residuals for the re-
gression without the observations from the Federal District. The results of this
procedure are shown in figure 5.2. As can be observed, there were no reduction in
7Belsley, Khu and Welsch (1980), pages 14 to 16.
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Figure 5.1: “Studentized” Residuals of the DVLS Estimation.





















the number of possibly influential observations, but there was a reduction of the con-
centration of these points, although two states, Roraima (state 14) and Ceará (state
23), showed two of these points. At any rate, when one calculates the MDFFIT
statistics to this new set of observations there are no values above the new critical
point (now with n = 150 and k = 36 the new critical value is 0.9798). This fact
suggests that none of the remaining states have a disproportionate influence on the
results.
Another experiment performed in order to test the robustness of the results
was the calculation of the MDFFIT statistics for the sample years. Thus, instead
of sequentially deleting the observations associated with each state, the observations
for each year of the sample were deleted and the respective MDFFIT calculated.
As the data from Federal District had already been deleted, the critical value for
this experiment was 1.053, a number that comes from a sample size of 130 elements
and 26 endogenous variables. None of the yearly MDFFIT was greater than the
critical value, which allows one to infer that no yearly observation is driving the
results.
The results of the DVLS regression, after deleting of the data from the Federal
District, as well as the other estimation procedures results are in tables 5.4 to 5.7
and will be discussed in the next section.
As the Brazilian states show large economic disparities, it is very likely that
some degree of heteroscedasticity will be present in the data. Furthermore, as the
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Figure 5.2: “Studentized” Residuals of the Estimation without the Federal District























sizes of the population of the states are very heterogeneous, changes in total amounts
may have a larger impact on the per capita values of the less populated states, and
this effect may imply a larger variance in per capita terms for these states.
In order to test for heteroscedasticity of the DVLS residuals, we followed a
maximum likelihood test devised in Greene (1997) 8. This procedure begins with the
collection of the DVLS residuals after which the variance of the errors is calculated.
The variance of the residuals of each state is calculated separately and then one can
compute the following statistic:





where σ̂2 is the total variance of the DVLS residuals, σ̂i
2 is the variance of the
residuals in state i, n is the total number of observations, ni is the number of
observations from state i (in this case ni = 6, ∀i) and m is the number of states
(m = 26).









2 = . . . = σ
2
m
Ha : ∃i, j : σ2i 6= σ2j
where σ2i is the true variance of the errors of state
i. Under the null hypothesis, H is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with m−1
degrees of freedom.
Using the residuals generated by the DVLS regression, we calculated the H
statistics for the regional data. The obtained value, H = 123.88, is greater than the
8See Greene (1997), pages 553 and 554.
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critical value χ0.01(25) = 44.31 and thus one can reject the null hypothesis that the
error variances are homogeneous across groups.
Because of the rejection of the hypothesis of homoscedastic residuals, robust
covariance estimators (White’s variance estimators) were computed and are shown
in the second column of Tables 5.4 to 5.7. The errors were then grouped according
to their variance and an Interactive Weighted Least Squares (IWLS) estimator was
constructed.
The clustering of the data in subgroups was done according to the following
procedure: first, the states were sorted according to their residuals variance in as-
cending order as shown in Figure 5.3. Then the two smallest errors variance states
were examined in order to test if the difference in their variances was significant
using the H statistic described above. If this difference was not considered signifi-
cant, the state with the next smallest variance was added to the test. This routine
was repeated until the null hypothesis (equal population variance across the tested
states) could be rejected. When this happened, the last state to be grouped was
taken out of the group and utilized to begin the formation of another group. In our
sample the first group was formed by 16, and the second by 10, states 9.
After the division of the states in two subgroups, the maximum likelihood test
was applied to each subgroup in order to check if one could accept the hypothesis
9 First group states: Rio Grande do Norte (RN), Pernambuco (PE), Piaui (PI), Goias (GO),
Minas Gerais (MG), Sao Paulo (SP), Paraiba (PB), Maranhao (MA), Sergipe (SE), Mato Grosso
(MT), Espirito Santo (ES), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), Para (PA), Santa Catarina (SC), Tocantins
(TO) and Bahia (BA). Second group states: Alagoas (AL), Amazonas (AM), Rondonia (RO), Rio
Grande do Sul (RS), Acre (AC), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Parana (PR), Roraima (RR), Ceara (CE)
and Amapa (AP).
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that the variances within subgroups are homogeneous. This procedure was utilized
to ensure that the choice of the subgroups was consistent. The results of the tests
are shown in Table 5.2. These results validate the utilized clustering, since they do
not reject the hypothesis of homogeneous variance within groups.
The division of the sample in two groups was then utilized to estimate a new
set of coefficients by IWLS; the results are shown in the third columns of Tables 5.4




















where there are G groups, σ̂2g ’s are the within group variance, obtained from the OLS
residuals, Xg are the matrices that contain the values of the exogenous variables of
the observations of the group g and Yg the vector with the values of the group’s
endogenous variables.
With the β̂WLS in hand, one may calculate the residuals produced by the
application of this estimator over the data by calculating:
êWLS = Y −Xβ̂WLS
where X and Y are the pooled values of the variables.
New within-group variances can be calculated from the vector êWLS and these
values may be utilized in order to recalculate β̂WLS. The IWLS estimator is obtained
when this process converges to some value, i.e., when the estimator utilized in the
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Figure 5.3: Variances of the DVLS Residuals.





















Low Variance Group 
High Variance Group 
Table 5.2:
Maximum Likelihood Test for Homoscedasticity within Subgroups
OLS Residuals
Group W Statistics χ0.01 DF
First 29.43 30.58 15
Second 15.96 21.67 9
Total 123.89 44.31 25
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residuals production is close enough to the estimator that arises when these errors
are applied as weights.
In the calculations performed in this paper, the stop criterion for the interac-





where β̂WLS(t) is the tth interaction of the WLS estimation and /• / is the cartesian
distance operator.
As seen in section 5.1, one of the most frequent problems that occurs during
the estimation of government reaction functions is the presence of simultaneity. In
the present model, the source of endogeneity, if it is present, resides most likely
in the interaction of the per capita “Discretionary Federal Resources Transfers”
(DFT) and the per capita “State and Local Revenues” (LR). In principle, it would
be hard to detect if a local government has low tax collections because it has received
high voluntary resources transfers, or if these transfers are large because the local
government has a low taxable capacity.
The other right-hand side variables are probably not subject to this problem
because they do not depend on local government decisions. For example, the per
capita “Local Government Debt Service” (LDS) reflect the stock of debt of a local
government, and the decision of the former in the present period only affects this
variable marginally.
Local government can only indirectly make decisions about the per capita “Net
Mandatory Federal Resources Transfers” (NMFT) (which are mostly determined by
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constitutional law), about the per capita “State Gross Domestic Product” (SGDP)
and about the per capita “State Voters Pivotal Probability” (SVPP) and these
decisions could hardly be related to the extraction of voluntary grants from the
federal government. Because of these considerations there was no attempt to use
other variables as instruments in the two stage procedures performed here.
In order to model this situation, one must include an equation to explain the
variations in the local governments collection of tax revenues. Chelliah, Baas and
Kelly (1975) and Piancastelli, Miranda and Vasconcelos (2004) use, besides the per
capita income, the participation of the agriculture, industrial and services sectors
in total GDP to explain tax revenues. In this paper, we use a modified version of
this equation, in which states’ tax revenues (LR) depend on the state per capita
income (SGDP), on the proportion of the non-agriculture GDP over the total GDP
(ISSGDP) and on the per capita level of the voluntary resources transfers (DFT) as
seen in equation 5.2:
LRit = θi + φt + ϕ1DFTit + ϕ2SGDPit + ϕ3ISSGDPit + µit (5.2)
Thus, equations 5.1 and 5.2 compose a system of equations in which DFTit and
LRit are simultaneously determined. In order to estimate equation 5.1 consistently,
we utilize the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) technique. First, the reduced form of
equation 5.2 was estimated and the predicted values of LRit were collected, These
predicted values were then utilized as an instrumental variables in the estimation
of equation 5.1. The results of this estimation are shown in the fourth column of
Tables 5.4 to 5.7.
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Naturally, these results may be influenced by the presence of heteroscedastic
residuals. Because of this, the tables also show White’s standard deviation of the
estimators (fourth column). A Two Stage Interactive Weighted Least Squares es-
timator (2SIWLS) was also computed for the equation system and the results are
reported in the fifth column of Tables 5.4 to 5.7. In this case, the clustering pro-
cess described above also produced two groups, the first one with 14 states and the
second with 12 states10, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Variances of the 2SLS Residuals.





















Low Variance Group 
High Variance Group 
10 First group states: Rio Grande do Norte (RN), Pernambuco (PE), Piaui (PI), Sao Paulo
(SP), Minas Gerais (MG), Goias (GO), Paraiba (PB), Maranhao (MA), Sergipe (SE), Mato Grosso
(MT), Espirito Santo (ES), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), Para (PA) and Tocantins (TO). Second
group states: Santa Catarina (SC), Bahia (BA), Alagoas (AL), Amazonas (AM), Rondonia (RO),
Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Acre (AC), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Parana (PR), Roraima (RR), Ceara
(CE) and Amapa (AP).
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The tests to verify the cluster choices are shown in Table 5.3. As can be seen
there, the hypothesis of homoscedasticity within groups cannot be rejected at a 99%
level of significance, but the test also shows that there is heteroscedasticity in the
total sample.
Table 5.3:
Maximum Likelihood Test for Homoscedasticity within Subgroups
Simultaneous Equations Residuals
Group W Statistics Critical χ20.01 DF
First 25.83 27.69 13
Second 22.12 24.73 11
Total 127.93 44.31 25
With this group division in hand, the 2SIWLS estimators for the simultaneous
equations model were estimated; the results are in the fifth column of Tables 5.4 to
5.7.
The last procedure performed was the test for residual spatial correlation.
Spatial correlation may appear in the data for a number of reasons. For example,
suppose that a severe drought affects some Northeast state. Possibly, the federal
government will increase the transfers of discretionary resources to that state in
order to alleviate the impact of the natural phenomenon. In this case, it is likely
that the drought is also harming some of the neighboring states. Thus the federal
government is expected to increase help for all those states affected by the drought.
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All those states would appear as points above the regression line only because they
are neighbors.
Before choosing the appropriate model to fit the data, one must see if spatial
correlation is indeed relevant to the phenomenon to be studied. The simplest way to
perform such verification is to fit the data by OLS and test for spatial dependence
of the residuals using a spatial autoregressive model; if the errors show some degree
of spatial correlation, one must be concerned about the best way of dealing with the
problem.
In order to test for residuals spatial dependence, one may utilize a First Or-
der Spatial Autoregressive Model(FAR), which is the simplest among the spatial
autoregressive models and may be represented in the following way:
ε = ρWsε + υ
υ ∼ N(0, σ2υIn)
where ε are the OLS residuals, υ are the residuals innovation and Ws is the stan-
dardized state contiguity matrix.
The matrix Ws is a derivation of the simple contiguity state matrix W . Each
column and line of W represents one of the 26 states. Suppose that state i is a
neighbor of state j, then both elements Wij and Wji will be equal to one. If they
are not neighbors, Wij = Wji = 0. By definition, all diagonal elements are equal to
zero. Ws is obtained by dividing each element of W by the sum of its row. In this
way, every row of Ws must sum up to one
11.
11 This is the simplest specification of the contiguity matrix. One could make it more sophisti-
cated by making each cell of the matrix proportional to the distance between the states’ capitals,
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The test for the presence of first-order autocorrelation is equivalent to the
test for the significance of the estimator ρ, i.e., a simple t-test. If one cannot
reject the null hypothesis that ρ = 0, he cannot accept the hypothesis of spatial
autocorrelation. The complication with this estimation is that ordinary least squares
will produce an estimator which is both biased and inconsistent. Thus, one must
utilize a maximum likelihood estimator in order to compute ρ̂.
In our exercise, as we are dealing with a panel data set, we will use a modified
version of this model in order to test for spatial correlation:
E = ρΛE + ε (5.3)
E is a vector of the residuals to be tested for spatial correlation. Just to be
as clear as possible, we are going to test four sets of regression residuals, one from
each regression described in this section (DVLS, IWLS, 2SLS and 2SIWLS). Each
set of residuals must be sorted first by state number, since the contiguity matrix is
based on this classification12 and then by year. The matrix Λ is the panel contiguity
matrix and is obtained as follows:
or other distance measure. Another common specification is to put a value of one if states are
neighbors and a value of one half if they are neighbors of the neighbors. The simplest specification
for the contiguity matrix is the most utilized in the literature and is recommended whenever one
does not have a strong reason to use a more complex one.
12Those are the Brazilian states names, codes and acronyms according to the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE): 11 - RONDÔNIA (RO); 12 - ACRE (AC); 13 - AMAZONAS
(AM); 14 - RORAIMA (RR); 15 - PARÁ (PA); 16 - AMAPÁ (AP); 17 - TOCANTINS (TO);
21 - MARANHÃO (MA); 22 - PIAUÍ (PI); 23 - CEARÁ (CE); 24 - RIO GRANDE DO NORTE
(RN); 25 - PARAÍBA (PB); 26 - PERNAMBUCO (PE); 27 - ALAGOAS (AL); 28 - SERGIPE
(SE); 29 - BAHIA (BA); 31 - MINAS GERAIS (MG); 32 - ESPÍRITO SANTO (ES); 33 - RIO
DE JANEIRO (RJ); 35 - SÃO PAULO (SP); 41 - PARANÁ (PR); 42 - SANTA CATARINA(SC);
43 - RIO GRANDE DO SUL (RS); 50 - MATO GROSSO DO SUL (MS); 51 - MATO GROSSO
(MT); 52 - GOIÁS (GO); 53 -DISTRITO FEDERAL (DF).
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Λ = I26 ⊗Ws (5.4)
where I26 is the 26 by 26 identity matrix and ⊗ is the Kronecker operator. Thus Λ
is a 262 by 262 block diagonal matrix in which the diagonal partitions are formed
by Ws.
As it will be seen in the next section, spatial correlation was not found in any
of the estimated models (see Tables 5.4 to5.7), and because of this there was no
necessity to model it using a more sophisticated procedure.
As seen in Appendix C, the absence of spatial correlation in the residuals may
occur even if there is spatial dependence in the intercepts. Because of this, we
applied a FAR model using the intercepts as dependent variables in order to detect
this type of spatial correlation.
5.4 Discussion of the Results
Table 5.4 shows the estimation results for the time-effects. As one can see,
most of these effects are not statistically significant. Exceptions may exist for the
coefficients associated with the years of 1997 and 1998. The parameter γ1997 is
significant in the IWLS and in the 2SIWLS models and it is positive in all models
except the DVLS. In the case of γ1998, this coefficient is positive and significant in
all models if one considers a 10% level in all cases.
This fact may be explained by the implementation of the 1997 State Debt
Renegotiation Act, which was concluded in 1998 and resulted in massive transfers of
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Table 5.4:
Results of the Estimations: Yearly Time Effects
Model →
Variable ↓
DVLS IWLS 2SLS 2SIWLS
γ1995 -0.03088** -0.00548 -0.03027** 0.00395
0.0168 W 0.0210 0.0061 0.0168 W 0.0211 0.0034
γ1996 -0.02318 -0.00295 -0.02276 0.02101*
0.0159 W 0.0168 0.0048 0.0168 W 0.0173 0.0040
γ1997 -0.00004 0.01464* 0.00030 0.03348*
0.0138 W 0.0127 0.0036 0.0139 W 0.0128 0.0063
γ1998 0.02371* 0.02790* 0.02376** 0.00939**
0.0115 W 0.0095 0.0027 0.0123 W 0.0105 0.0049
γ1999 -0.00094 0.00773* -0.0009 0.00346
0.0113 W 0.0098 0.0028 0.0115 W 0.0097 0.0062
Standard errors and White standard errors (W) below estimates.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.
capital from the federal government to the indebted states. As these transfers are
computed as “Discretionary Federal Resources Transfers”, we might expect to find
a shift in the intercept in that year. Figure 5.5 shows that the level of the “Capital
Transfers” from the federal government to the states is unambiguously larger in 1997
and 1998.
In the case of the cross-sectional effects, most of them were independently
significant (see Table 5.5) and furthermore, they showed spatial correlation when one
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Figure 5.5: Yearly Capital Transfers from Federal to State Governments

















considers the estimates obtained from the DVLS and 2SLS13. This spatial correlation
can be appreciated in the maps of Figure 5.6. There, one can see that the states
with high cross-sectional effects are those in the south and southeast region, while
the low cross-sectional effects are mostly present in states of the northeast region.
Most of the central states have a medium cross-sectional intercept.
It is interesting to notice that the spatial correlation was not detected in the
residuals, as can be verified by the observation of the t-statistics in the fifth row
of Table 5.7. This means that the spatial dependence is not present in the errors
generating process.
13 Asymptotic t-statistics of 3.253 and 3.444, respectively. The IWLS and 2SIWLS estimation
did not produce spatially correlated intercepts.
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Instead, this dependence appears in the generation of the intercepts, which
can be viewed as an unconditional initial voluntary resource transfer endowment.
This pattern shows, beyond the spatial correlation, a positive relation with
states’ wealth. Probably, this effect is associated with the public capital stock, which
is greater in southern states and requires resources for its maintenance and operation.
It is also probably masking the influence of the state GDP over the distribution of
voluntary resources (see the later discussion of the coefficient of SGDP).
Table 5.6 shows the estimates of the exogenous variables other than the dummy
variables. One can see that the estimates for the effect of per capita local revenue
(LR) and of per capital local debt service (LDS) were not significant in any of the
estimation models. In the first case, this finding might result from the failure to
consider the differences in states’ potential tax collection. Since states and munic-
ipalities have distinct tax bases and economic development, it would be expected
that, with the same fiscal effort, some states would collect more taxes than others.
As the utilized variable only considers the absolute per capita value, this fact is not
considered in the estimation.
The problem with the estimated coefficients associated with LDS may come
from a number of factors, but the most important is the pattern of the compensation
for localities with high levels of debt. Most of these payments do not come from
regular, yearly transfers. Instead, they take the form of sporadic bailouts in the form
of capital transfers. These transfers probably appear in the estimation as outliers
and are not fully captured by the estimators. This pattern of compensation is likely
hiding the expected positive relationship between the payment of debt services and
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Table 5.5:
Results of the Estimations: State Cross-Sectional Effects
Model →
Variable ↓
DVLS IWLS 2SLS 2SIWLS
α11 0.04666** 0.10946* 0.04651 -0.05538*
0.0277 W 0.0221 0.0366 0.0304 W 0.0247 0.0189
α12 0.12512* 0.08302 0.12368* 0.03177
0.0549 W 0.0488 0.0635 0.0574 W 0.0522 0.1411
α13 0.32418* -0.12274* 0.32366* 0.07694*
0.0573 W 0.0755 0.0168 0.0578 W 0.0763 0.0183
α14 0.36032* 0.00116** 0.35809* 0.23643*
0.066 W 0.0698 0.0007 0.0673 W 0.0733 0.0318
α15 -0.03197 0.21018* -0.03287 0.01659
0.0411 W 0.0346 0.0224 0.0425 W 0.0361 0.0141
α16 0.21620* -0.07432* 0.21407* 0.06746
0.0657 W 0.0801 0.0175 0.0688 W 0.0835 0.0416
α17 -0.07776 0.24852* -0.07869 0.00888*
0.0501 W 0.0525 0.0362 0.05 W 0.0520 0.0041
α21 -0.17168* 0.03405** -0.17292* -0.06994*
0.0591 W 0.0588 0.0189 0.06 W 0.0590 0.0085
α22 -0.17759* 0.07014* -0.17800* -0.06562*
0.0545 W 0.0621 0.0157 0.0553 W 0.0622 0.0084
α23 -0.00722 0.20780* -0.00762 -0.07126*
0.0366 W 0.0419 0.0221 0.0369 W 0.0427 0.0248
α24 -0.02002 0.04957 -0.02026 0.02501
0.035 W 0.0298 0.1699 0.0357 W 0.0303 0.0155
α25 -0.10430* 0.24753* -0.10446* -0.02888*
0.0432 W 0.0449 0.0541 0.0454 W 0.0461 0.0031
α26 -0.05305** 0.09584* -0.05288 -0.00625*
0.0319 W 0.0288 0.0112 0.032 W 0.0289 0.0006
α27 -0.04669 0.24156* -0.04845 -0.12178*
0.0518 W 0.0424 0.052 0.0522 W 0.0431 0.0271
α28 -0.02573 0.00426* -0.02627 0.01002*
0.0333 W 0.0270 0.0012 0.0334 W 0.0270 0.002
α29 -0.06789* 0.07795* -0.06793* -0.15890*
0.0262 W 0.0215 0.0272 0.0274 W 0.0223 0.0253
α31 0.10025* 0.09464* 0.10114* 0.04100
0.0388 W 0.0370 0.0125 0.041 W 0.0374 0.0442
α32 0.1546* 0.20364* 0.15549* 0.06492**
0.0474 W 0.0528 0.0173 0.0476 W 0.0522 0.036
α33 0.53423* 0.00407* 0.53497* 0.24873*
0.0866 W 0.1118 0.0017 0.0882 W 0.1121 0.0163
α35 0.35405* 0.13211* 0.35831* 0.14142*
0.1337 W 0.1344 0.0252 0.1341 W 0.1313 0.0542
α41 0.21366* 0.23662* 0.21503* -0.02457*
0.0611 W 0.0781 0.0316 0.061 W 0.0769 0.0047
α42 0.28791* 0.09829* 0.28906* 0.21732*
0.0701 W 0.0814 0.0136 0.0716 W 0.0812 0.0634
α43 0.34410* -0.05755* 0.34505* 0.06431*
0.0767 W 0.0912 0.0126 0.0769 W 0.0905 0.0114
α50 0.18238* 0.16305* 0.18283* 0.11329*
0.0384 W 0.0409 0.0295 0.0398 W 0.0412 0.0244
α51 0.15017* 0.08411* 0.15034* 0.10453*
0.0309 W 0.0276 0.0135 0.0309 W 0.0274 0.0202
Standard errors and White standard errors (W) below estimates.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.
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Table 5.6:
Results of the Estimations: Exogenous Variables
Model →
Variable ↓
DVLS IWLS 2SLS 2SIWLS
LR 0.01249 -0.00313 0.01399 0.03426
0.0374 W 0.0262 0.0065 0.1052 W 0.0819 0.0238
NMFT -0.20057* -0.09212* -0.19895* -0.13990*
0.067 W 0.0806 0.0241 0.0674 W 0.0828 0.0234
LDS 0.00602 0.00637 0.01212 -0.03087
0.0706 W 0.0442 0.0115 0.1017 W 0.0656 0.0195
SGDP -67.32260* -35.31520* -67.67743* -30.66019*
17.055 W 20.631 6.028 17.975 W 20.823 6.143
SVPP 4.64293* 3.43204* 4.54061* 2.96644*
2.1961 W 2.3304 0.6821 2.1716 W 2.3755 0.6918
Standard errors and White standard errors (W) below estimates.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 10% level.
the federal voluntary transfers to states.
At any rate, these to results do not support the hypothesis of existence of
Soft Budget Constraint in the relationship between Brazilian states and the federal
government.
The coefficients associated with the per capita net mandatory federal resources
transfers (NMFT) are significant and negative in all estimation models. This means
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Figure 5.6: Cross-Sectional Effect Spatial Distribution.











that states that receive large amounts of compulsory transfers are somewhat ne-
glected in the distribution of the discretionary resources.
The magnitude of the coefficients goes from negative 0.0921 to negative 0.2006,
which means that for each dollar received as mandatory transfers, there is an average
loss of discretionary resources in the range of 9 to 20 cents.
It is worthwhile noticing that the mandatory federal transfers include resources
transferred to state and municipal governments, as well as, payments made directly
by the federal government to a locality population. Thus, the estimation results
show two parallel effects from discretionary resources compensation. The first one
is related to the regional equalization scheme. Since states which receive more
equalization transfers are neglected in the distribution of discretionary resources,
the established redistribution system is somewhat undermined.
Furthermore, this compensation may have a dual effect on the ideal balance
between public and private resources. On the one hand, when public resources are
directly transferred to private pockets, they naturally lose their public character, i.e.,
they will be utilized for private consumption. On the other hand, in the presence of
the compensation mechanism, this above-average level of payments or transfers to
persons would lead to a decrease in the discretionary resources transfers, which are
for public consumption.
Thus, from the standpoint of the federation, the central government may be
spending an appropriate level of resources in that locality, but from the local pop-
ulation perspective, the level of public good consumption is too small. This phe-
nomenon might explain the situation of some states, like Rio de Janeiro, in which
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there is a clear contrast between the spending of the federal government in direct
payments to persons (very high) and the level of the public goods and services
consumption (very low).
The states gross domestic product (SGDP) has, in all four estimations, nega-
tive and significant effects. Their magnitude varies from negative 67.68 to negative
30.66, as SGDP is expressed in Reais millions and the discretionary federal transfers
(DFT) in Reais thousands. These coefficients mean that each over-average Real in
SGDP decreases the discretionary resource transfers in an amount between 3 and 7
cents.
The theoretical model predicted this negative effect although this result does
not support the “too big to fail” effect. In this case the redistributive reason would
be stronger than the externalities effects. But a careful interpretation of this result
is needed. Observe that the intercept may be absorbing most of the correlation
between the endogenous variable and the states’ wealth. In fact, when the corre-
lations between the intercepts and the states residential capital are calculated, the
obtained values are significantly positive for three (DVLS, 2SLS and SIWLS) of the
models considered14. Thus, although the coefficient directly associated with SGDP
is showing a negative signal, indicating the presence of the distributive motive, one
must take in consideration that, as the richer states have a large initial voluntary
resource transfer endowment, the “too big to fail” effect can not be ruled out. The
14 In order to calculate these correlations a series of total residential capital produced by the
Brazilian Institute of Applied Economics (IPEA) was utilized. The values found were 0.457 for
the DVLS model, 0.461 for the 2SLS model, 0.315 for the 2SIWLS and 0.021 for the IWLS model.
The positive correlation hypothesis could not be rejected in the three first models.
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effect would be associated in this case with the wealth of the state, not with its
income.
Finally, the coefficients associated with the state voters pivotal probability
(SVPP) were all positive and significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent
with the view that the federal government takes into consideration the proportional
political weight of the states when distributing discretionary resources. But one
cannot infer from these results that the federal government is purely politically
motivated, since the data cannot exclude the possibility of a two-argument (political
self-interest and federation well-being) federal government objective function.
The comparison of the coefficients estimated by the DVLS model with those
produced by the 2SLS model seems to imply that endogeneity is not present in the
data, since the estimates produced by both models are very similar. Likewise, in
the case of the heteroscedastic-corrective models (IWLS and 2SIWLS), there are no
important discrepancies between the estimated coefficients. Observe that in almost
all cases (except in the IWLS coefficient for LR), all the signals are the same for all
four models, providing some support for the robustness of the estimations.
The test statistics and other parallel results of the estimated models can be
found in Table 5.7. The coefficient of determination of the four models ranges from
0.7878 (2SIWLS model) to 0.8001 (DVLS model), while the adjusted coefficients go
from 0.7259 to 0.7418. These numbers are not very high for a panel analysis, but
they seem to be satisfactory, especially when one takes into consideration the quality
of Brazilian data. The F -statistics are significant for all four models, suggesting the
validity of the overall models in explaining the fiscal interaction.
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Table 5.7:
Selected Test Statistics for the Estimated Models
Model →
Statistics ↓
DVLS IWLS 2SLS 2SIWLS
R-Square 0.8001 0.7900 0.7999 0.7878
Adj. R-Square 0.7418 0.7288 0.7416 0.7259
F-Statistics 13.723 12.899 13.710 12.730
Fix Effect Rel. 7.7700 6.9147 7.7300 6.7778
Spatial T-Test
Residals
0.5733 0.9669 0.6510 1.1450
Spatial T-Test
Intercepts
3.2530 -0.8898 3.4438 1.0248
In the fourth row of Table 5.7, one can see the results of the test for panel fixed
effects. The statistics showed also have a significant F -statistic indicating that there
is substantial gain in the use of the DVLS model instead of a simple cross-section
OLS.
The fifth row of the Table 5.7 shows the t-statistics for error spatial depen-
dence. As said before, based on these numbers one could reject the hypothesis of
spatial correlation of the residuals, since their level of significance are higher than
25%. But when the intercepts spatial t-statistics are considered, the presence of
spatial dependence is clear, at least in the DVLS and 2SLS models. This may imply
that although a negative relation between the discretionary federal transfers and
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the states GDP has been found in all the estimated models, there is at least a sus-
picion that these grants are positively related to states’ wealth, since the spatial




In this dissertation, we have studied the consequences of the Brazilian bud-
getary process for the functioning of the Brazilian federal system. At the institu-
tional level, it was found that the central government’s power of executing unilat-
eral adjustments to budget items makes the distribution of federal resources pro-
nouncedly discretionary. States and municipalities, knowing that the federal gov-
ernment may use this power, could potentially try to exploit it by adopting policies
which are not compatible with their budget constraints but are beneficial to their
own constituents since they expect the central government to rescue them from their
fiscal difficulties.
The theoretical models explored two types of behavior for the central gov-
ernment. In the first, the federal government was benevolent, in the sense that its
objective function reflected a weighted sum of the individual state utility functions.
In the second model, a principal-agent problem appeared since the central govern-
ment had a non-altruistic objective function. Namely, it aimed to maximize its
reelection probability. Both models were compared with the first-best centralized
solution.
In both cases, the reaction functions of the federal government showed some
important properties. First of all, they exhibit a negative relationship between local
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tax collection and discretionary grant disbursements. This indicates the presence of
a soft budget constraint, since it could promote a relaxation in local tax collection
efforts. States and municipalities may prefer to depend on transferred resources
from the federal government rather than press their constituents for an adequate
level of taxes.
The responses of the federal government to variations in debt service paid by
local governments also suggest the existence of a soft budget constraint. The more a
local government pays in debt service, the more it receives in discretionary transfers.
This pattern would allow states and municipalities to overborrow, since the cost will
be partially paid by the federation.
Another result of the theoretical model is related to the equalization mech-
anisms between the states of the Brazilian federation. This equalization is done
mainly by compulsory, non-matching grants which transfer resources from richer lo-
calities to the poorer ones. The model indicates a negative relationship between this
type of grant and the discretionary transfers, which suggests that the equalization
mechanisms can be somewhat undermined by the federal government.
These hypotheses were empirically tested and the first two, the negative rela-
tion between discretionary grants and local tax collection and the positive relation
between discretionary grants and local debt service payments were not supported
by the results. Thus, the empirical analysis did not corroborate the hypothesis that
Brazilian local governments exploit a soft budget constraint.
Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient of the influence of the compulsory federal
transfers to states and municipalities was negative and significant, attesting to the
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offsetting effect that discretionary transfers have on the equalization schemes in
Brazil.
The empirical analysis also revealed an apparent paradox. Although the dis-
tribution of discretionary transfers is negatively correlated with local per capita
income, the analysis of the cross-sectional fixed effects showed that higher inter-
cepts are related to richer states. Thus, the “too big to fail” effect described by
Wildasin (1997) was likely captured in the fixed effect parameters and only the
marginal income effects were left to the per capita income coefficient.
The more important distinction between the two theoretical models concerns
the relevance of state political power to federal decisions concerning discretionary
transfers. In the altruistic central government model, this variable does not exert
any influence over the allocation of federal resources; in contrast, it becomes a ma-
jor determinant of these allocations when a vote-seeking government is considered.
Thus, this political variable was included in the empirical tests in order to examine
the real motivation of the Brazilian federal government. The coefficients associated
with this variable were positive and significant in all four estimations, which sug-
gests that the federal government in Brazil is not purely altruistic and has political
survival concerns.
All these findings point to a number of problems generated by the budgetary
system in Brazil. First, even in the case of a non-politically motivated federal gov-
ernment, the present system is likely to produce a non-optimal allocation of federal
resources. One manifestation of this phenomenon would be an imbalance between
private and public good consumption in favor of the former. This fact has been
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observed in Brazil over the last decade. Most of the public budget has been allo-
cated to direct transfers to persons and interest payments, while spending in health,
education, investments and other public goods has had only modest increases, or
even decreases, in some years.
The cause for this imbalance lies in the partial substitutability between the
compulsory and the discretionary federal resource transfers, as detected in the em-
pirical tests. If the federal payroll is large in a certain locality, the discretionary
transfers to this jurisdiction will tend to be small. But payroll money will become
private consumption, while the discretionary resource transfers take the form of
public goods, in general.
As noted above, the sub-optimal proportion between public and private goods
consumption may arise even if the federal government does not act politically. How-
ever, the empirical tests performed in this dissertation suggest that the Brazilian
federal government acts, at least partially, in favor of its own interests.
In this case the budgetary process includes a political component that may
cause additional harm to the system. First, it is possible that a marginalization
process, as described in Seabright (1996), may occur. In this case, the states or
municipalities that are out of the federal government coalition would receive little
help from the central power.
Second, the bargaining for local support may result in unacceptable levels of
corruption with the federal government buying the individual votes of congressional
representatives with personal advantages, or more crudely, with public money. The
root of these co-optation or corruption channels is the high discretionary power that
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is in the hands of the federal government.
The reforms to confront this tendency toward potential opportunistic fiscal
administration have mostly taken the form of tight controls over state and local
government fiscal spending and borrowing. Several measures have been adopted
in this regard since the first Cardoso administration (1995-1998). They culminated
with the implementation of the 1997 Fiscal Responsibility Act that establishes limits
for public servants’ payroll and debt/revenue ratios, among several other parameters.
Several observations could be made about the 1997 Fiscal Responsibility Act.
First, one could point out that it leads to a higher degree of centralization since it
constrains state and municipal power over several fiscal decisions.
Second, the Fiscal Responsibility Act does not preclude bailouts. What it does,
or tries to do, is to create conditions that make the need for a bailout less likely.
However, there have been no changes in the credibility of the federal government
no-bailout threat. Indeed, some people see the 1998 state debt renegotiation as a
bailout, although its terms were not painless to the states.
Third, it is supposed to limit potential local governments’ opportunistic behav-
ior, but it does not intend to constrain federal government’s opportunistic behavior.
A truly effective reform of the Brazilian budgetary system would have to in-
clude a decrease in this discretionary power. The key aspect is that the Brazilian
budget is authoritative, which means that once it has been approved by the congress,
the executive branch has the right of spending, but not the duty of spending, the
budgeted sums. Thus, the executive is able to make unilateral rescissions without
congressional approval. This feature allows the executive to spend discretionary
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budgetary resources, creating a channel for local and state government free-rider
behavior as well as for pork barrel spending.
The change from an authoritative to a mandatory budget is needed, but it
is not a simple matter. There are several difficulties associated with this desirable
transition. First, congressmen would have to commit themselves to more realistic
revenue and spending forecasts. One of the arguments in favor of the authoritative
budgetary system is that it is a flexible way to deal with decreases in estimated
tax revenues, since if the estimates are not realized, the federal government may
automatically adjust spending to actual tax revenue. However, this argument has
lost weight in recent years as inflation rates have decreased to more modest levels
in Brazil.
A second argument in favor of the authoritative budgetary system is that this
is the only way through which the federal government could possibly generate a
primary surplus in order to pay its huge interest bill. Taking into consideration
the present political situation in Brazil, one could argue that it is not feasible to
generate a primary surplus in the budget by congressional decision. Thus, the only
mechanism for the federal government to achieve a surplus in its accounts is to use
its discretionary power over the budget and unilaterally save resources to pay its
debt service.
As can be seen, there is need for both empirical and theoretical research on
these issues. Future research on this topic may include a better way of dealing with
the local tax collection effort in the empirical estimations as well as an intertemporal
version which would allow a more complete analysis of the impact of the SBC on
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local debt administration. Mechanism design studies of the Brazilian budgetary
process are also needed in order to improve the efficiency of federation resource use
and to avoid the possibility of SBCs. These are only a few topics in the longer




A.1 MatLab Code for Calculating Pivotal Probabilities
clear













[wr, wc] = size(w);
for i = 1:2ˆj
load(strcat(’RES’, num2str(i)));
aux2 = [comp base];
aux3 = round(aux2*w);
aux4 = [aux2 aux3];







for i = 1:2ˆj
load(strcat(’RES’, num2str(i)));
for ii = 1:n
aux5 = sum(kron(aux4(:,ii),ones(1,wc)).*aux4(:,n+1:n+wc));
aux6 = sum((1-kron(aux4(:,ii),ones(1,wc))).*aux4(:,n+1:n+wc));




clear aux4 aux5 aux6 aux7
stage = 3
fresa = sparse(zeros(wr,2*wc));
for i = 1:2ˆj
load(strcat(’RES’, num2str(i)));








A.2 Intercepts Spatial Dependence and Panel Data Estimation
The objective of this appendix is to show that the spatial correlation of the
intercepts may be masked when one is fitting the data with a fixed effect panel data
model. In order to detect this spatial dependence a test using the intercept values
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is needed. Furthermore, the spatial correlation will be detected in the residuals if a
simple cross-section regression is estimated utilizing data of one period only, while
it will not appear in the complete panel data estimation.
Suppose the data are generated by the following random process:
y = Dα + Xβ + ε (A.1)
α = ρWα + µ (A.2)
ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε InT ) (A.3)
µ ∼ N(0, σ2µIn) (A.4)
E[εµ′] = 0 (A.5)
where y is the vector that contains the values of the endogenous variables, X is now
a nT × k matrix that contains the values of the k exogenous variables for each of
the n cross-section units across T periods, ε are the regression disturbances, W is
the n× n contiguity matrix, α is the n× 1 fixed effect vector, ρ is the spatial lag of
the fixed effects, µ is the fixed effect spatial innovation, I is the identity matrix and




i 0 . . . 0
0 i . . . 0
...
0 0 . . . i


where i is T × 1 collum vector of ones and 0 is T × 1 collum vector of zeros.
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In this case, one could rewrite equation A.2 in order to express the intercept
vector α in the following way :
α = (In − ρW )−1µ = Θµ (A.6)
The matrix Θn×n is symmetric, but not necessarily idempotent. From equation
(A.6) is possible to compute the covariance matrix of the fixed effects:
αα′ = Θµµ′Θ′ ⇒
E[αα′] = ΘE[µµ′]Θ′ ⇒
E[αα′] = σ2µΘ
2 (A.7)
Equation (A.1) may be expressed in another convenient form when equation (A.6)
is applied into it:






 + ε (A.8)
Notice that if one applies the least square dummy variable model (LSDV) in
the estimation of the data generated by the process described above, the residuals
obtained will not show spatial dependence. In order to see that, first notice that























Thus the residual vector is:
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LSDV ] = σ
2
ε Mz (A.11)
since Mz is an idempotent matrix.
Equation (A.11) shows that the covariance matrix does not exhibit spatial
correlation. Thus, if there is spatial dependence in the cross-section intercepts the
test of the LSDV residuals will not detect it.
It is interesting to notice that, if one estimates the same data set with the
OLS model, i.e. without using the cross-section fixed effect dummies, the inter-
cepts spatial dependence will spillover to the residuals. Consider the simple OLS
estimator:
βOLS = (X
′X) X ′y (A.12)
Equation (A.12) implies that the OLS residuals are:
êOLS = y −XβOLS = y −X (X ′X) X ′y ⇒
êOLS = Mxy (A.13)
where:
Mx = I −X (X ′X) X ′
Thus the covariance matrix of the OLS residuals is:
E [êOLS ê
′




Mxy = [I −X (X ′X) X ′] [DΘµ + Xβ + ε] = Mx [DΘµ + ε]
and thus:





′Mx = Mx [DΘµ + ε] [µ′Θ′D′ + ε′] Mx ⇒
êOLS ê
′
OLS = Mx [DΘµµ
′Θ′D′ + DΘµε′ + εµ′Θ′D′ + εε′] Mx ⇒
E [êOLS ê
′
OLS] = E [Mx [DΘµµ
′Θ′D′ + DΘµε′ + εµ′Θ′D′ + εε′] Mx] ⇒
E [êOLS ê
′
OLS] = Mx [DΘE [µµ









Equation (A.14) shows that the OLS residuals covariance matrix depends on
the fixed effect innovation variance σ2µ, as well as on the contiguity matrix W and
on the fixed effects spatial lag ρ (since Θ = (I − ρW )−1). This means that the fixed
effect spatial dependence will manifest itself in over the OLS residuals when a simple
OLS (without fixed effects) is utilized to fit the data.
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